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The Constitutional Right to Expert
Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases
by
DAVID MEDINE*
The ability to obtain an expert witness' can be a decisive factor in
civil litigation. Without the benefit of expert testimony, litigants may be
unable to prove all but the most readily observable injuries and cannot
make use of any sophisticated techniques for valuing losses. For exam-
ple, in a suit by a landlord against an indigent tenant, an expert may be
required to establish damages in a breach of warranty of habitability
counterclaim. The judge may insist on a real estate expert's testimony
regarding the market value of the apartment given its poor housing con-
ditions. The thesis of this Article is that the due process clause of the
Constitution requires expert assistance for indigent civil litigants in cer-
tain appropriate cases.
The cost of expert assistance2 is one of many financial burdens faced
by indigents3 in civil lawsuits. In general, these burdens may be divided
into two categories: access fees and equipage. 4 Access fees are costs im-
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Daniel 0. Conkle, and Carol Juliet Weil.
1. "Expert witness," as used in this Article, refers to one who is entitled to testify at trial
regarding her opinion when a lay witness' opinion is inadmissible. "Expert assistance" refers
to assistance to litigants provided by similarly qualified persons out of court. The Article
principally will consider fees experts charge for their time and services, not the statutorily
mandated witness fee that must be paid to all witnesses who are subpoenaed to testify at trial.
2. Fees for expert witnesses can be very large. See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987) ($86,480.70 in expert witness fees incurred); Glenn v.
General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1573 n.15 (11th Cir. 1988) ($12,614 in expert witness
fees), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 378 (1988).
3. For purposes of this Article, an "indigent" is one who cannot afford to pay even court
fees without depriving herself or her family of the day-to-day necessities of life. See
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1162 n.36. Significantly, this definition does not require
that a person be "wholly destitute" in order to receive special consideration with regard to
court fees. See Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948).
4. Michelman, supra note 3, at 1163. See also Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045,
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posed as a legal condition of participation in judicial proceedings. 5 They
include the costs of filing a lawsuit, service by a marshall or sheriff, and
fees for demand of a jury trial.6 Failure to pay these fees can result in an
indigent's inability to present her case, or in rejection of the case by the
court.7 By contrast, equipage costs are expenses required to make an
effective presentation of one's case once filed.8 Equipage costs can in-
clude attorney, laboratory, or expert witness fees. These expenses are
owed to third parties who are not a part of the court system. Either civil
plaintiffs or defendants may incur equipage expenses in asserting claims
or defenses.
Many litigation access barriers for indigents have been lowered. 9 It
is logical that courts generally have considered barriers to access before
moving on to equipage. There is no need for equipage if an indigent
cannot even get into court. By the same token, however, access to the
courts for an indigent may not be of practical significance without provi-
sion for equipage.' 0
The Article examines strategies courts might employ to provide ex-
pert assistance to those unable to afford it. Finding these strategies inad-
equate, it then explores the feasibility and makes the case for a
constitutional right to expert assistance for indigents in civil cases. It
concludes that entitlement to expert assistance, grounded in the princi-
ples of due process, ensures that litigants are not treated arbitrarily or
unfairly due to indigence.
1048, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) ("expenses payable by litigants to third per-
sons other than public officers commonly labelled 'auxiliary expenses' ").
5. Michelman, supra note 3, at 1163.
6. It is even possible that such fees could be charged to civil defendants as well as plain-
tiffs. Id. at 1154 n.n.4-5. But see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) ("Surely no one
would contend that either a State or the Federal Government could constitutionally provide
that defendants unable to pay court costs in advance should be denied the right to plead not
guilty or to defend themselves in court.").
7. See Campbell v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 23 Wis. 490, 490-91 (1868) (case dismissed
because plaintiff unable to pay security for costs); Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36
HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1923) (indigent may be "cast out of court"); Note, In Forma
Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Actions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461,
1461 n.3 (1985) (authored by Kenneth R. Levine) ("a pauper may lose his day in court alto-
gether if he cannot afford to meet court costs").
8. Michelman, supra note 3, at 1163.
9. A series of United States Supreme Court cases have struck down access fees, espe-
cially for indigent criminal defendants. See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14
(1961) (state may not require an indigent prisoner to pay filing fee to file habeas corpus action);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (indigent defendant may not be required to pay a fee
before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction).
10. Michelman, supra note 3, at 1165-66 n.42.
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Part I of the Article demonstrates the importance of availability of
expert witnesses to the indigent civil litigant. While an expert may be
useful in many cases, in some situations it is not possible to establish a
claim or defense without the benefit of such assistance.
Part II of the Article examines ways that indigent civil litigants
under contemporary civil procedure and court rules can obtain experts.
If an indigent is able to raise the expert's fee, or if the expert agrees to
defer compensation, courts might regard expert witness fees as costs at
the conclusion of the litigation. Alternatively, courts often have author-
ity to appoint their own expert witnesses. A judge could appoint an ex-
pert for an indigent who could not afford to hire her own. The Article
discusses why these approaches are not adequate solutions to facilitating
expert assistance for indigent civil litigants.
In light of the inadequacy of current judicial practice, Parts III and
IV address whether indigent civil litigants have a constitutional right to
the appointment of an expert, or the provision of funds required for the
retention of an expert.11 The equal protection and due process clauses
are examined as possible doctrinal sources for such a right. 12 At one
point it appeared that the equal protection clause might serve as the basis
11. Commentators have argued that the sixth amendment requires expert witnesses in
criminal cases because of: 1) the right to compulsory process of witnesses, Note, Expert Serv-
ices and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake y. Oklahoma, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1326, 1337 n.79 (1986) (authored by John M. West) [hereinafter Note, Expert
Services] and Note, Criminal Procedure - Defendant's Due Process Right to a Psychiatric Ex-
pert - Ake v. Oklahoma, 8 CAMPBELL L. REv. 323, 330 (1986) (authored by William D.
Auman) [hereinafter Note, Criminal Procedure] (discussing People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228,
221 N.E.2d 645 (1966)); 2) the right to effective assistance of counsel, Decker, Expert Services
in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of lndigents, 51 U.
CIN. L. REv. 574, 593-99 (1982); and, 3) the confrontation clause, Note, Expert Services,
supra, at 1337 (though not yet relied upon by any cases); Note, The Indigent's Right to an
Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL
L. REv. 632, 642-43 (1970) (authored by Craig Bowman) [hereinafter Note, Indigent's Right].
Because sixth amendment rights protect criminal defendants and not civil litigants, these rights
are not considered.
12. It has been suggested that the first amendment provides constitutional support for an
indigent's right to expert assistance in criminal cases. Note, A First Amendment Right of Ac-
cess to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973) (authored by Coleman H. Casey and
Stewart G. Rosenblum). The assumption underlying this argument is that the first amendment
right to petition applies not only to elected representatives of the people, but to the judiciary as
well. Id. at 1060. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963), the Supreme Court stated
that "litigation is not [always] a technique of resolving private differences; it [can be the] means
for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by [the] government.... It is thus
a form of political expression." The right to petition arises in this context because the judiciary
has the power to make the law and to nullify legislative enactments, and is a forum for the
expression of dissatisfaction. Note, supra, at 1059-60. Limitations on standing and jus-
ticiability, such as article III of the Constitution, are treated as procedural regulations analo-
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for a claim that disparate treatment of indigents by the court system is
unconstitutional. Part IV examines the development of equal protection
gous to limitations placed on the right of legislative petition, such as on participation in
legislative hearings by private citizens. Id. at 1060 n.34.
A right to petition in cases in which expert testimony is required is ineffective for indi-
gents who cannot afford to hire the experts. Nonindigents who can afford experts would have
an unfair advantage in petitioning the judiciary for redress. The first amendment rationale for
an entitlement to experts, however, does not withstand scrutiny.
Although there are, indeed, Supreme Court decisions that appear to support a first
amendment right to petition the judiciary, see for example, United Transp. Union v. State Bar
of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971) (right of union to assist members in filing damage suits);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964) (right
of union to advise members on choice of attorney); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 416-17
(1963) (right of NAACP to refer individuals to an attorney), most cases deal with the right of
individuals to associate together for the purpose of pursuing legal claims. In one case, however,
the court, in dicta, appeared to recognize a right to petition the judiciary. California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Court in that case stated that
"[c]ertainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition." Id. at 510. In California
Motor Transport, a number of businesses filed an antitrust suit against their competitors argu-
ing that the competitors used administrative and judicial proceedings to interfere with plain-
tiffs' business activities. Id. at 509. The Court held that federal antitrust laws may overcome
the right to petition if the challenged litigation is a "sham" to cover anticompetitive activities.
Id. at 516.
Even assuming a first amendment right to petition the judiciary, however, this right
would not support the provision of expert witnesses for indigents in civil litigation. The most
significant problem is that the first amendment provides only a right to access, not to assistance
in taking advantage of that access. By analogy to the right of free speech, one may have the
right to publish a book, but no right to government assistance with the printing expenses. Use
of expert witnesses cannot be denied but each litigant must bear the expense entailed. Nothing
in the first amendment's language, which is prohibitionary, nor its application, suggests that it
has a positive as well as a negative effect. There is no limit to the litigation expenses the
government would be required to subsidize if the first amendment were found to support a
claim for expert assistance.
Another limitation on grounding the right to expert assistance in the right to petition is
that the first amendment arguably would advance the rights of plaintiffs-because they are
seeking to express themselves through bringing a lawsuit-but not those of defendants. A
defendant may file a counterclaim, however, recasting herself into a petitioner entitled to first
amendment protection. Of course, it is possible to argue that this right to petition is matched
by a similar right to express oneself in response. Legal defense could be cast as a form of
expression. This might raise some problems if the defendant's strategy is simply to challenge
the plaintiff's ability to satisfy the burden of proof. In those instances, the defendant is forced
to look to the due process clause for protection and assistance. Note, supra, at 1068 n.78.
There is some indication that the Supreme Court is unwilling to give the first amendment
any significance beyond that given the due process clause in this context. In Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), the Court stated: "[a]ppellants also claim a viola-
tion of their First Amendment right to petition for redress. Our discussion of the Due Process
Clause, however, demonstrates that appellants' rights under the First Amendment have been
fully satisfied." Id. at 660 n.5. In the context of refusing to strike down a $10 limitation on
attorney's fees in certain veterans' claims proceedings, the Supreme Court found that the first
amendment had "no independent significance" and that appellees' first amendment claims
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law with regard to indigents" and its ultimate merger with due process
analysis.
Part IV develops an argument that due process of law is violated
when an indigent cannot be "heard" effectively without benefit of an ex-
pert. The section demonstrates that Supreme Court decisions regarding
the rights of indigents support the conclusion that failure to provide indi-
gent civil litigants with expert assistance violates due process. The deci-
sion whether to appoint an expert in individual cases or classes of cases
should be based on a balancing of the individual and governmental inter-
ests involved and the efficacy of the expert's involvement. Part IV also
addresses some practical questions regarding implementation of a system
for appointing experts for indigent civil litigants.
I. Indigent Civil Litigants' Need for Expert Assistance
[A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because
of poverty to parry by his own [expert] witnesses the thrusts of those
against him.
Judge Cardozo 13
Imagine an indigent couple are living in an urban apartment. They
fall behind in rent and their landlord brings an eviction action. They find
a legal services lawyer to represent them in landlord-tenant court. The
lawyer advises them that, because their apartment is in terrible condition,
with paint peeling, inadequate heat in the winter, and leaky faucets, they
can counterclaim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
They appear in landlord-tenant court and request a jury trial. There
is a fee for jury trials but the judge quickly grants their request to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis based on a local statute waiving the jury trial fee.
At trial, the judge rules that in order to recover damages for breach of
warranty of habitability the tenants must present expert testimony as to
the market value of their apartment by someone familiar with the local
housing market. That figure will be subtracted from their rent in order
to determine the amount actually owed the landlord. Unfortunately, the
tenants are unable to afford the fees of an expert witness. As a result, the
tenants are unable to present their case fully. In fact, the judge grants a
were "inseparable" from their due process claims. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985).
One commentator has argued that there should be a "right of judicial access" woven from
strands of doctrine based upon procedural due process, equal protection, and the first amend-
ment rights of speech and petition, supported by the ninth amendment. See L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 10-18, at 759 (2d ed. 1988).
13. Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929), quoted in Little v.
Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2857 (1988).
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directed verdict against them on their counterclaim. The landlord is
awarded a judgment for full back rent despite the substandard conditions
of the apartment.
Variations on this scenario can occur in a wide variety of cases.
Without expert assistance, access to the courts for indigents may indeed
be a hollow right. At the extreme, there are instances in which the in-
ability to obtain an expert itself is fatal to the case. Sometimes, an expert
witness is critical to rebut the testimony of an adversary's expert, to assist
in preparing cross examination of the adversary's expert, or to establish
the indigent's claim in the most forceful way. 14
Courts have required expert testimony on particular issues in some
civil cases. For instance, courts have required expert testimony on the
issue of defectiveness in a number of product liability actions.' 5 One
court held that "expert testimony is required because of the complex and
technical nature of the commodity. The fact of an injury ... does not
establish the presence of a defect."1 6 Expert testimony thus may be es-
sential to establish an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. If ex-
pert testimony is required to prove an element of plaintiff's prima facie
case, the failure to produce expert testimony at trial may lead to a di-
rected verdict against the plaintiff.' 7
Courts have required expert testimony in medical malpractice ac-
tions in order for the plaintiff to establish the appropriate standard of
care: "Only physicians who practice their profession at a particular place
could have any knowledge of the method of treatment customarily used
14. Of course, there are also instances in which an expert witness would be of marginal or
no benefit.
15. See, e.g., Wernimont v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1981) (expert testimony regarding defectiveness an "indispensable element" of plain-
tiff's case). See Comment, Requiring Expert Testimony on the Defect Issue in Products Liabil-
ity Cases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 209, 210-12 (1987) (authored by Joseph D. Steadman) (expert
testimony ordinarily required for plaintiff to establish that defect exists, but in Alabama, expert
testimony not required if lay jurors could reasonably infer that defective condition of product
is cause for injury); Note, Products Liability and the Problem of Proof 21 STAN. L. REV. 1777,
1782 (1969) (authored by Stephen S. Walters) (when lay jury can not reasonably infer that
defect caused product failure, expert testimony by plaintiff is required to show proximate
cause). See also Makuc v. American Honda Motor Co., 835 F.2d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 1987)
(expert testimony required on causation issue).
16. Comment, supra note 15, at 211 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm,
395 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1981)).
17. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 8 Ohio App. 2d 199, 202, 195 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965); Comment, supra note 15, at 211-12.
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by the other members of the profession practicing there; the subject,
therefore, calls for expert opinion only."' 8
Expert testimony also has been required in negligence suits, 19 legal
malpractice cases, 20 and professional malpractice cases generally.2 1 In
some cases, expert testimony also may be required to prove damages.22
The requirement of expert testimony is not necessarily imposed by
statute or formal court rule. For instance, in the District of Columbia,
for a period of time a number of judges required expert testimony in
landlord-tenant lawsuits similar to the above fact pattern.2 3 Illinois
courts also have required expert testimony to establish the fair rental
value of an apartment or house given its defective condition.24
18. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. 2d 89, 95, 199 P.2d
302, 307 (1948) (quoting Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 433, 74 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1937)
(emphasis added)). See also Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1988)
(expert medical testimony required to defeat motion for summary judgment); Schmidt v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 105 N.M. 681, 684, 736 P.2d 135, 138 (1987) (In a malpractice action, expert
testimony is generally required.); Note, Compelling Expert Testimony: A Proposed Statutory
Reform, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 209, 216 n.59 (1978) (authored by Richard R. Patch) (expert testi-
mony generally required to support a claim of negligence in malpractice actions). Expert testi-
mony also may be required to establish proximate cause. See Sitts v. United States, 811 F.2d
736, 740 (2d Cir. 1987) (Expert medical testimony is required even in a case tried by the court
and when negligence is within the layperson's realm of knowledge. Such testimony may be
required to prove that negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.). See also C.
KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 29.01[2] (1988) ("the rule is that expert evidence is ordi-
narily necessary to support the conclusion of causation").
New York has imposed a requirement that before filing a medical, dental, or podiatric
malpractice action, the attorney consult with an expert physician, dentist, or podiatrist, respec-
tively, to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for commencing the suit. N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 3012-a(a) (McKinney 1988). The attorney only need make three good faith
attempts at such consultation. Id. at 3012-a(a)(3). The statute does not indicate, however,
whether an attorney seeking a free consultation on behalf of an indigent litigant is proceeding
in good faith.
19. Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Ins. Co., 807 F.2d 1102, 1109 (1st Cir. 1986) (to
prove malfunction was due to operator negligence).
20. See Schmidt v. Henehan, 140 Ill. App. 3d 798, 801-02, 489 N.E.2d 415, 417 (1986)
(expert testimony required to prove legal malpractice).
21. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 801 F.2d 908, 911
(7th Cir. 1986) ("Expert testimony is required as a matter of law in most cases of malpractice,
i.e., of professional negligence."). See also Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F.
Supp. 1017, 1027 (D. Conn. 1975) (expert testimony may be required to prove breach of
warranty).
22. Spagat v. Schak, 130 11. App. 3d 130, 136, 473 N.E.2d 988, 994 (1985) (to prove
value of property).
23. See Comment, The Effect of the Requirement of Expert Testimony on the Tenant's
Ability to Prove Damages in a Breach of Warranty of Habitability Action, 29 How. L.J. 177,
183 (1986) (authored by Philip W. Coleman) (a judge-made rule in municipal court that re-
quires expert testimony in landlord-tenant dispute is followed by a minority of judges).
24. Id. at 184. See Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Blackberry Union Cemetery,
32 Ill. App. 3d 62, 65, 335 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1975); Fusco, Collins & Birnbaum, Damages for
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Without some form of assistance in these cases, an indigent is unable
to assert legitimate claims or defenses solely because of her inability to
hire an expert witness. Often an indigent cannot rely on a contingency-
fee lawyer to take her case,25 especially if the representation requires sig-
nificant expenditures for expert witnesses. There are, of course, less ex-
treme examples of the importance of expert testimony. During a civil
trial, there are numerous instances in which such testimony could be crit-
ical: accounting in tax cases; 26 analysis of glass, teeth and bite marks,
and medical opinions in tort actions;27 handwriting, typewriter, and ink
analysis in contract and will cases; 28 genetic testing for paternity; 29 psy-
chiatric and psychological reports in family disputes;30 and technology-
based evidence such as neutron activation analysis, atomic absorption
spectrometry, trace metal detection, and gas chromatography.3' The list
Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Illinois - A Realistic Approach, 55 CHI.[-
]KENT L. REV. 337, 349 & n.67 (1979) (lessee's testimony regarding fair market value of
property is inadequate because the lessee is not an expert).
There has been opposition to the requirement of expert testimony in this context. Ac-
cording to the Vermont Supreme Court, "imposition upon indigent tenants of the financial
burden of supplying expert witnesses would seriously diminish the effectiveness of the relief."
Comment, supra note 23, at 185- (quoting McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 362 N.E.
2d 548 (1977)). It has been noted that "imposing on impoverished tenants the burden of prov-
ing fair market values, presumably by presenting expert witnesses in what is supposed to be a
summary process, would diminish the relief Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) affords tenants." Recent Cases, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
84 HARV. L. REV. 729, 736-37 (1971).
25. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Central Motor Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 470, 487 (10th Cir. 1978)
(testimony of accounting expert in suit for refund of federal taxes).
27. See, e.g., Valenti v. Akron Police Dep't, 37 Ohio St. 3d 717, 532 N.E. 2d 769 (1988)
(evidence that bite mark expert ruled out plaintiff as attacker in false arrest suit).
28. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 427-29, 71 P.2d 220, 228-29 (1937)
(testimony of handwriting and ink experts regarding note payable after maker's death).
29. See, e.g., In re Estate of Raymond Lukas, Sr., 155 Il. App. 3d 512, 517-25, 508
N.E.2d 368, 372-77 (issue of paternity of alleged heir), appeal denied, 116 Il. 2d 555, 515
N.E.2d 111 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 714, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1159-
60 (1985) (psychologist testified on issue of child custody); In re Marriage of Corwin, 366
N.W.2d 321, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (conflicting testimony by psychologists regarding
child abuse on issue of child's custody).
31. See, e.g., National Research Dev. Corp. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 410 F. Supp.
1108, 1117 (D. Del. 1975) (neutron activation analysis used in patent infringement case).
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seems endless. 32 The absence of such testimony could be dispositive in
many cases. 33
Even if an indigent does not wish to offer her own expert testimony,
the other side may. In order to rebut such testimony effectively, the indi-
gent may be required to have her own expert. With the proper assistance
even seemingly neutral results from commercial laboratories offered by
an adversary may be subject to challenge. Studies have shown that fed-
eral, state, local, and private laboratories can have significant error
rates 34 that are relevant if, for instance, an indigent wants to challenge a
dismissal from school or employment after a positive drug or AIDS test.
In a highly specialized area, counsel for an indigent litigant, and
more likely a pro se indigent litigant, may have no idea where to look for
evidence or how to deal with it when it is found. Expert witnesses can
play a critical part in the preparation of a case. They can assist the indi-
gent's counsel in planning the presentation of the case, and in gathering
and organizing the available evidence.35
32. See, e.g., Cagle v. Cox, 87 F.R.D. 467, 472 (E.D. Va. 1980) (testimony by corrections
experts considered indispensable to plaintiffs and extremely helpful to court in evaluating
plaintiffs' claims); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 64 F.R.D. 102, 105 (N.D. Miss.
1974) (lay testimony can be inappropriate; technical advice would be indispensable to plaintiff
challenging installation of a new municipal sewer system); Note, The Contingent Compensation
of Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 52 IND. L.J. 671, 686-87 (1977) (authored by Reed E.
Schaper) ("The use of experts in litigation has become almost a fixture in many areas-anti-
trust, condemnation, desegregation, malfunction and defects in design in products liability,
malpractice in an increasing number of professions, obscenity control, patent and copyright,
probate-the list continues.").
33. See, e.g., Dawes v. Pellechia, 688 F. Supp. 842, 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (expert testi-
mony though not required, is dispositive for a determination of "adequacy" of police training);
Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 1405, 1419 n.65 (expert testimony necessary as a practical matter to prove breach of
warranty).
34. SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 5 (E. Imwinkelried ed. 1981). See also Decker,
supra note 11, at 579 ("the questionable level of competence... suggests that a defendant's
interest in a second expert opinion is a necessity, not a luxury").
35. See Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v.
Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957, 963 (1985) (authored by Helen Hubbard) (arguing that mental
health experts participate extensively in the criminal process).
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II. Expert Assistance for Indigents Not Based on a
Constitutional Right
[Congress has not] extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to
allow [expert witness] fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts
might deem them warranted.
- Chief Justice Rehnquist 36
Before considering any constitutional entitlement that indigent civil
litigants may have to expert assistance, it is important to consider
whether a constitutional approach is necessary. If expert assistance can
be obtained through statute, rule, judicial order, or by other means, it is
unnecessary to find constitutional support.
The limited funding of the Legal Services Corporation has meant
that many indigent litigants go unrepresented in civil cases. The lucky
few who can obtain legal services counsel still face the problem of fund-
ing for expert witnesses. While Legal Services Corporation regulations
do not prohibit their offices from paying for expert witnesses explicitly,
they do require some consideration of the costs of handling certain types
of cases. 37 Given existing budget constraints such offices likely will
choose to expend funds on attorneys and other staff to provide help to
the greatest number of eligible clients.
Given the apparent inability of Legal Services and similar organiza-
tions to provide expert assistance, this part of the Article examines the
assistance to indigent litigants that can be provided by courts, either by
assessing costs at the conclusion of the lawsuit or by appointing an expert
as the court's witness. As will appear, neither of these provide effective
expert assistance in the wide range of civil cases in which indigent liti-
gants participate.
A. Shifting the Cost of Expert Witnesses to the Losing Party
There are a number of methods by which the court can require the
losing party in a civil case to pay an adversary's expert witness fees. For
example, the court can tax the prevailing party's expert witness fees as
costs38 at the conclusion of a lawsuit, as other court costs are taxed. 39 A
36. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444 (1987) (quoting Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975)).
37. See 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2(b)(9) (1988) (factors to consider in establishing office priori-
ties include "[w]hether legal efforts will result in efficient and economic delivery of legal serv-
ices") (emphasis added); 45 C.F.R. § 1620.3 (1988) (allocation of resources may take into
account "the considerably higher costs of providing [certain] services").
38. To tax costs is to assess against the losing party those expenses of the lawsuit that the
prevailing party is legally entitled to recover.
39. 'See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on
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1987 decision by the United States Supreme Court, however, will im-
pede, if not eliminate, such cost shifting in the future.
In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T Gibbons, Inc.,4° the Supreme Court
ruled that federal courts are constrained by statute to award only thirty
dollars per day in witness fees as costs for each witness, regardless of
whether the witness is a lay or expert witness. Two federal statutes and a
rule of civil procedure were read together to reach, in the Court's view,
the only rational construction of the three. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 54(d) provides that a court may award costs at the conclusion of a
case.41 The term "costs" in Rule 54(d) is defined in 28 U.S.C. section
1920(3) as including witness expenses.42 The problem is that 28 U.S.C.
section 1821 sets a limit of thirty dollars per day43 on the rate of compen-
sation for witnesses, an amount not intended to cover the fees of an ex-
pert witness.44 This limit on witness fees was established in response to
the concern that losing litigants were being saddled with huge costs. 45
Thus, following Crawford Fitting, the full cost of hiring expert witnesses
for indigent civil litigants cannot be shifted to the adversary. 46 This re-
other grounds, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984);
Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 676 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 461 U.S. 952 (1983); Roberts v. S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos, 651 F.2d
201, 209 (3d Cir. 1981). Contra Murphy v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 774 F.2d
114, 134 (6th Cir. 1985) (majority rule is that expert witness fees cannot be taxed as costs),
cert denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986).
40. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides that "[e]xcept when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs."
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982) provides in relevant part that "[a] judge or clerk of any court
of the United States may tax as costs ... (3) Fees ... for... witnesses ... 
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1982) provides:
A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30 per day for each day's attendance. A
witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in
going to and returning from the place of attendance at the beginning and end of such
attendance or at any time during such attendance.
44. The United States Senate Report on the bill, S. REP. No. 187, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1231, 1232, states:
It is recognized that certain witnesses will not, under the proposed rates, be ade-
quately compensated. In order to fairly compensate everyone appearing as a witness
it would be necessary to have either a graduated scale of fees, or leave the amount of
such fees in the discretion of the judge. Neither was considered feasible, and there-
fore the amounts arrived at herein are more or less arbitrary, but considered to be
reasonably fair to the average witness ....
See also H. REP. No. 1651, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, reprinted in '1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2033 (compensation of witnesses for travel, lodging and attendance fixed by
statute).
45. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 440.
46. See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987) (no authority to tax
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sult is consistent with the general "American Rule" that each party bears
its own litigation expenses.47
Indigent litigants in state court civil proceedings often do not fare
better than they do in federal court. Many states do not allow expert
witness fees to be taxed as costs, regardless of whether an indigent is a
party.48 Thus, indigent litigants must look to authority other than court
rules if expert witness fees are to be taxed.
Expert witness fees also may be imposed upon an adversary if the
federal statute on which the suit is based contains a fee-shifting provi-
sion. Many federal statutes provide for such shifting of expert witness
fees.49 For example, expert witness fees may be taxed in Consumer Prod-
expert witness fees as costs in civil suits after Crawford Fitting, even when expert required to
establish claim), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1298 (1988).
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion in Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 444, as well as
Justice Marshall in dissent, id. at 447 n. 1, would have reserved the question of whether expert
witness fees in excess of $30 per day could be awarded in civil rights actions pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988. Nothing in the majority's opinion, however, suggests that § 1988 suits should
be treated any differently and several courts have taken the position that Crawford Fitting is
controlling. See Ecos, Inc. v. Brinegar, 671 F. Supp. 381, 404 n.12 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (Craw-
ford Fitting found persuasive in a § 1988 case); Bee v. Greaves, 669 F. Supp. 372 (D. Utah
1987) (same); see also Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1370 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (law of the
circuit prior to Crawford Fitting).
The Tenth Circuit, in Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir. 1983), held that
expert witness fees could be awarded as part of attorney's fees under § 1988, though not as
costs under § 1920. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (dic-
tum), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Drake v. Perrin, 593 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa.
1984); see also Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 618 F. Supp. 398, 405-06 (D. Colo. 1985) (by
analogy in Age Discrimination in Employment Act case). The viability of these decisions after
Crawford Fitting is not clear.
47. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Chi-
cago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 801 F.2d 908, 912 (7th Cir.
1986) (Under the "American Rule," "the winning party must bear the expense of his side of
the lawsuit.").
48. See, e.g., James P. Driscoll, Inc. v. Gould, 521 So. 2d 301, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (charges made by expert witnesses for reports submitted to an attorney, for conferences
with an attorney, and for waiting at the courthouse to advise the attorney during the course of
the trial are not taxable costs); Naiditch v. Shaf Home Builders, Inc., 160 Ill. App. 3d 245, 268,
512 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 (1987) (fees of a structural engineer incurred in trial preparation not
recoverable by successful litigants), appeal dismissed, 117 Ill. 2d 545, 517 N.E.2d 1088 (1987);
Mist v. Westin Hotels, Inc., 738 P.2d 85, 92-93 (Haw. 1987) (expert witness fees are not taxa-
ble as costs, absent a statute specifically allowing such an expense); Nichols v. Bossert, 727
S.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (in the absence of a statute or a contractual agree-
ment, a party is not obligated to pay the other party's expert witness fees); Estepp v. Miller,
731 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (in the absence of statutory authority or exceptional
circumstances, experts' fees are not taxable as costs). See Comment, supra note 15, at 224
n.99.
49. See International Woodworkers v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 t.2d 1174, 1179 n.7
(5th Cir. 1986) (list of 28 statutes which provide for taxing expert witness fees as costs in civil
actions), aff'd sub nom, Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Note,
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uct Safety Act actions for injuries that result from violation of consumer
product safety rules 50 and under the Equal Access to Justice Act in civil
actions, other than tort cases, brought against the United States.5 1 These
fee provisions are designed either to encourage suits that enforce a fed-
eral policy, if awarded to plaintiffs, or to discourage frivolous or vexa-
tious litigation, if awarded to defendants.5 2 Litigants in antitrust and
civil rights actions often seek recovery of expert witness fees, despite the
fact that the underlying statutes contain no fee-shifting provisions. These
requests rarely succeed,53 though they had limited success in antitrust
cases prior to Crawford Fitting, because expert testimony was found to be
"necessary" in proving damages.5 4
One significant consequence of financing experts through the taxa-
tion of costs is that costs may be taxed against the indigent civil litigant
at the conclusion of the case.55 Taxation thus may be a high stakes eco-
nomic gamble for the indigent litigant. If she prevails, her expert witness
costs are paid by her adversary. Yet, if she loses, not only is she responsi-
ble for her own expert witness fees, she may be required to pay her adver-
sary's expert witness fees as well. This could act as a strong deterrent to
asserting legitimate, although not certain, rights in court.5 6
Reliance on taxation of expert witness fees also fails to address a
practical problem-many indigents cannot afford to pay for expert testi-
mony in advance of trial. The possibility of recovery of such expenses at
Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REv.
1222, 1228-29 (1973) (authored by Archie T. Wright III) (environmental statutes permit ex-
pert fee award at court's discretion) [hereinafter Note, Awarding Attorney Fees]; Note, The
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 562, 563 n.4 (1978)
(authored by Christopher E. Manno) [hereinafter Note, Civil Rights]; Note, Expert Witness
Fees as Taxable Costs in Federal Courts--The Exceptions and the Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REv.
1207, 1216 (1987) (authored by Mary Jo Huddson) [hereinafter Note, Expert Witness Fees].
50. 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2073 (private enforcement
of consumer product safety rules).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
52. Note, Expert Witness Fees, supra note 49, at 1216-18.
53. Id. at 1219.
54. See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 339 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984).
55. See, e.g., Harris v. Forsyth, 742 F.2d 1277, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(appellate costs); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1981) (trial costs), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1151 (1982); see also Bartell, Taxation of Costs and Awards of Expenses in Federal
Court, 101 F.R.D. 553, 565-66 (1984) (indigence does not immunize a losing party from taxa-
tion of costs).
56. While in some instances such costs are uncollectible against indigent litigants, it re-
mains possible that indigents who are working will have their already low wages garnished or
will receive negative credit reports based upon the unpaid costs.
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the conclusion of fhe case would not overcome the economic hurdle of
retaining the expert in the first instance.
For these reasons, it appears that reliance on taxation of costs gener-
ally would not serve the interests of indigents.
B. A Court Can Appoint an Expert as its Own Witness
In most cases advance payment of expert witnesses is necessary. An
expert is unlikely to perform work for an indigent client without being
assured of payment. Even if the expert were willing to accept a promise
of future payment, this effectively would constitute a contingency fee. 57
The indigent would pay the expert only if she prevailed. A contingency
fee for an expert raises serious problems due to the interest that the ex-
pert would have in her client prevailing.58 Since the expert is paid only if
the client is successful, the expert might not testify openly or truthfully if
it would harm the client's case. In any event, there would be a public
perception of a conflict of interest. 59
One solution for indigent civil litigants is to request court appoint-
ment of expert witnesses. 60 A federal district court judge has the author-
57. In theory, the indigent litigant could make an unconditional though practically unen-
forceable promise to pay the expert witness. In practice, if the expert's fee is a significant
amount, it is clear that the only likelihood of payment is upon the contingency that the indi-
gent prevails.
58. Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 554 F.2d 534, 538-39 (2d Cir. 1977)
(state bar rule proscribing payment by attorneys of contingent witness fees is constitutional),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977); Note, supra note 32, at 674 (such arrangements heighten the
suspicion that complicity exists). But see Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th
Cir. 1988) (in dicta: rule prohibiting retaining expert witnesses on contingency fee is one of
professional conduct, not admissibility; plaintiff may testify as own expert witness).
59. The Comment to Rule 3.4 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1984) states that the "common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay ...
an expert witness a contingent fee."
60. Another possibility is for the indigent civil litigant to subpoena an expert to testify as
any other witness would be subpoenaed. In a 1946 Alabama Supreme Court case, Hartley v.
Alabama Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 247 Ala. 651, 25 So. 2d 680, 681-82 (1946), the court, in
dicta, stated that an expert witness could be subpoenaed and, so long as special preparation
was not required or agreed upon, the witness was entitled only to a regular witness fee. See
also Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976) (there is no constitutional or
statutory privilege against the compulsion of expert testimony); Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179,
48 N.E. 108, 196-97 (1897) (a physician, subpoenaed as an expert witness, held in contempt
for refusing to testify on grounds that he had not been paid special compensation).
Apparently, however, no jurisdiction has been willing to compel an expert to testify when
preparation or examination is required in order to form an opinion. See, e.g., Ondis v. Pion,
497 A.2d 13, 18 (R.I. 1985) (court refused to compel physician to give expert testimony after
he had been subpoenaed and testified on patient's treatment); Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d
236, 242-43 (Iowa 1983) (party must demonstrate some compelling necessity for an expert's
testimony and expert cannot be required to engage in any out of court inquiry); Note, supra
note 18, at 218-19 (proposal for statute that would allow expert testimony to be compelled
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ity to appoint a neutral expert witness based on Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence61 as well as the "inherent power" of federal courts to
take actions, including the appointment of experts, that are essential to
their judicial authority.62
In one case the court concluded that:
While § 1915 does not authorize the district court's order [that
the government pay witness fees], we conclude upon careful analysis
that Federal Rules of Evidence 614(a) 63 and 706(b), read in light of 28
with provision for reasonable compensation). Moreover, language in FED. R. EvID. 706 and
many similar state rules that provide for court appointment of experts forbids the appointment
of nonconsensual 'experts. Federal Rule 706(a) provides that an "expert witness shall not be
appointed by the court unless he consents to act."
61. FED. R. EVID. 706 provides:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may
request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert wit-
nesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selec-
tion. 'An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to act.
A witness so appointed shall be info rmed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy
of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall
have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his
findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to
testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each
party, including a party calling him as a witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compen-
sation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable
from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions and
proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil
actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such pro-
portion and at such times as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner
as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may au-
thorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling
expert witnesses of. their own selection.
62. T. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS 1 (Federal Judicial Center 1986). See
also United States v. Green, 544 F.2d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1976) (the "inherent power" to appoint
an expert is "clear"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977); FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory commit-
tee's note (the "inherent power" is "virtually unquestioned"). If an expert is needed by an
indigent litigant for out-of-court assistance only, it may be necessary to rely on the court's
inherent power to appoint an expert because it has been held that Rule 706 does not provide
authority for the appointment of experts for purposes other than testifying. See Reed v. Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 746 (6th Cir. 1979) (authority to appoint-expert to advise or
consult with a special master was based on court's "inherent" power or FED. R. Civ. P. 53
(appointment of masters)).
63. FED. R. EvID. 614(a) provides that the court "may, on its own motion or at the
suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
called." If the court does call a witness as its own, either lay or expert, no witness fees or
travel expenses need be tendered at the time the subpoena is served. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)
("[w]hen the subpoena is issued on behalf of the United States or an office or agency thereof,
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U.S.C. §§ 192064 and 241265 (1982), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), 66 con-
fer upon the district court discretionary power to call lay and expert
witnesses as the court's own witnesses and to order the government as a
party to this case to advance their fees and expenses, such advance
payment to be later taxed as costs.67
Courts thus may require that one or both parties advance expert
fees. 68 If one of the parties is indigent, that party may be excused from
contributing her share.69 The decision as to which party should advance
the fees of an expert witness is not, however, directly related to which
party ultimately prevails, or is likely to prevail, in the suit. 70
At the conclusion of the case, the court must tax the costs it has
incurred to the parties in the case. 7 1 The court has discretion to tax the
fees and mileage need not be tendered"); Note, supra note 7, at 1476 & n.74. The court thus
has discretion to call lay or expert witnesses on behalf of indigent civil litigants who cannot
afford to pay witness fees. See United States Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1057-60
(8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3227 (1989); Note, supra note 7, at 1471-73.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988) provides in relevant part that "[a] judge or clerk of any court
of the United States may tax as costs the following ... (3) Fees and disbursements for printing
and witnesses; ... (6) Compensation of court appointed experts ... 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988) provides, in relevant part:
(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and
expenses of attorneys ... to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States ... (d)(2) For the purposes of this subsection-(A) "fees
and other expenses" includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses ....
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) states:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United
States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, its officers, and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. Costs may be taxed by
the clerk on one day's notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action
of the clerk may be reviewed by the court.
67. Means, 741 F.2d at 1057 (emphasis added).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note ("[The judge] may require the
parties to contribute proportionate shares of the fee in advance. He may think it wise to excuse
an impecunious party from paying his proportionate share."); see also Means, 741 F.2d at 1058
("plain language of Rule 706(b) thus permits a district court to order one party or both to
advance fees and expenses for experts that it appoints"). T. WILLGING, supra note 62, at 15
(court-appointed experts should be paid in advance to avoid the possibility of bias based on the
superior ability of one party to pay their fee at the end of the case).
69. Means, 741 F.2d at 1058. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 410 comment
(1947). Cf Bennett v. Ravenswood City Police Dep't, 109 F.R.D. 418, 419 (S.D. W. Va.
1986) (cost of transcript to be advanced by nonindigent party; may be taxed as costs against
indigent and taken from any ultimate recovery).
70. Means, 741 F.2d at 1059.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) states that the "United States shall not be liable for any of the
costs ... incurred." See also Note, supra note 7, at 1477 ("Section 1915(e) may be interpreted
to mean that the court must ultimately tax to the parties any expenses it advances."). Since
§ 1920(6) covers expenses of court-appointed experts, their fees may still be taxed as costs, as
Crawford Fitting applies only to noncourt-appointed experts. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987). Fees for expert witnesses that have been appointed by
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costs of any court-appointed witnesses against either or both parties.72
Just as with advanced expert fees, the court may, but is not required, to
take into account the fact that one of the parties is indigent in deciding
how costs should be taxed.73
Court appointment of experts is not the solution to the inability of
indigent civil litigants to afford expert witnesses. First, in addition to
testifying in court, experts serve a valuable function in assisting counsel
or pro se litigants in case planning and preparation. 74 The neutrality of
court-appointed experts precludes them from providing that service.
Second, courts have been extremely reluctant to appoint expert wit-
nesses. 75 Thus, as a practical matter, indigent civil litigants cannot rely
.on courts as a source of assistance in obtaining the services of expert
witnesses. Third, while judges may take indigence into account in taxing
the costs of expert witnesses, they are not required to do so. The poten-
tial financial responsibility for expert witness fees, in the event the indi-
gent litigant does not prevail, may deter requests for assistance. Finally,
it has been suggested that judicial appointment of expert witnesses for
indigents pursuant to Rule 706 may violate the ethical constraint on hir-
the court pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 706(b) are defined as taxable costs under § 1920(6) sub-
ject only to the "reasonable compensation" limitation in Rule 706(b).
In criminal cases, the court has authority under FED R. CRIM. P. 28, to appoint an
expert to be paid for by the government. In 1953, the Judicial Conference concluded that it
would be "fruitless" to seek a similar rule for civil proceedings based on the belief that "Con-
gress was unlikely to appropriate funds to pay expert witness fees in civil cases." Hart v.
Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (Rule 706 provides for ap-
pointment of experts at the expense of the parties), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
72. Note, Expert Witness Fees, supra note 49, at 1214-15; Note, supra note 7, at 1475.
See Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 570 F. Supp. 1237, 1248 (D.N.J. 1983) (85% of costs
awarded to party that prevailed on almost all of the issues), aff'd, 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985);
United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D.N.J. 1976) (United
States as party must pay its share of fees of expert witness appointed by court).
73. Note, supra note 7, at 1475 & n.68. See United States Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741
F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3227 (1989); Maldonado
v. Parasole, 66 F.R.D. 388, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory commit-
tee's note ("No doubt in the usual case the judge will provide that the expense of the experts
shall be taxed as costs and paid by the loser.").
74. See section IV(F)(5), infra, on the value of partisan experts.
75. See Means, 741 F.2d at 1059 (expert witnesses should only be appointed under "com-
pelling circumstances"); FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory committee's note ("actual appointment is
a relatively infrequent occurrence"); see also Applegate v. Dobrovir, Oakes & Gebhardt, 628
F. Supp. 378, 383 (D.D.C. 1985) ("compelling circumstances" not present), aff'd, 809 F.2d
930 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2181 (1987). See T. WILLGING, supra note 62, at 3
n. 1 (only 37 cases found on Lexis and Westlaw in which an expert was appointed or Rule 706
discussed extensively) Comment, Court-Appointed Scientific Expert Witnesses: Unfettering Ex-
pertise, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 261 (1988) (authored by Pamela Johnston) (power rarely
exercised); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 706[01] (1987).
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ing expert witnesses on a contingency fee. 76 If the indigent prevails, the
fees will be taxed against her adversary. If the indigent loses, however,
she will not have funds to pay the expert,'7 thus leaving the expert un-
paid. 78 This effectively would make payment of the expert contingent on
one side prevailing, placing pressure on the expert to testify in a way that
is favorable to the indigent litigant.
A number of states have rules of evidence which are similar to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 706. 79 Those rules are subject to the same deficien-
cies as the federal rule with regard to providing expert assistance to
indigent litigants in civil cases.
As a result, court appointment of expert witnesses does not provide
adequate assistance to indigent civil litigants.
III. Wealth Discrimination and Equal Protection
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets de-
pends on the amount of money he has.
- Justice Black 8°
The Supreme Court's treatment of wealth discrimination 8' in the
context of access to the courts and equipage has evolved from an equal
76. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.51 n.162 (2d ed. 1985).
77. Note, Expert Witness Fees, supra note 49, at 1214 n.50.
78. This assumes that the court has not required advance payment of the expert's fee.
FED R. EvID. 706 gives the judge discretion with regard to the timing of payment to the
expert: "[Tihe compensation [of the court-appointed expert] shall be paid by the parties in
such proportion and at such time as the court directs .... According to the commentary to
the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 410 (1947), which was the basis of the current FED. R.
EVID. 706, "[n]o doubt ip the usual case the judge will provide that the expense of the experts
shall be taxed as costs and paid by the loser. He may require the parties to contribute propor-
tionate shares of the fee in advance" (emphasis added). See Means, 741 F.2d at 1058.
79. See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 706 (Court may appoint any expert witness of its own selec-
tion. Compensation is payable from funds which may be provided by law; otherwise the com-
pensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion as the court sees fit.); CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 730-733 (West Supp. 1988) (The court on its own motion may appoint an expert to
investigate and to testify at trial. Compensation for expert testimony in certain criminal, civil
and juvenile actions are charged to the county where the action is pending. Otherwise, com-
pensation shall be apportioned between the parties as the court decrees.); MAINE R. EVID.
706(a) (The court may appoint expert witnesses. The expert witness shall be informed of his
duties by the court and shall advise the parties of his findings and shall be available for cross-
examination at trial.).
80. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81. Expenses of litigation are required of both rich and poor. Thus, technically there is
no overt discrimination against those who are not wealthy. The concern is with the dispropor-
tionate impact of the requirement of payment on the poor.
Disproportionate eflect, standing alone, however, has not been enough to trigger height-
ened equal protection review, even in the context of race. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977) (disproportionate impact is not
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protection analysis under the Warren Court, to a due process view under
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Justice Black's statement above, made
in the context of holding that a state must provide an indigent criminal
defendant with a free trial transcript for use on appeal, 82 demonstrates
the Court's initial, expansive view of wealth discrimination. In a plural-
ity opinion written by Justice Black and joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Douglas and Clark, grounded in both due process and equal
protection,8 3 the Court concluded that discrimination based upon pov-
erty is no more permissible than discrimination based on "religion, race,
or color."
'84
irrelevant, but is not the only test of racial discrimination, and, standing alone, does not qualify
the impact for strictest scrutiny.); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (same).
In fact, these cases do not forbid discrimination by the government; they require it by
giving preferential treatment to indigents. This is what concerned Justice Harlan. Nonethe-
less, the shorthand of "wealth discrimination" will be used to describe this disparate impact.
82. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16. Although a transcript was not a prerequisite to perfecting an
appeal, the state conceded that in order to receive "adequate appellate review" a transcript was
necessary. Id. See Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (free transcript must be
provided for appeal of a civil habeas corpus hearing, even though alternative means is available
because a "liberty" interest was involved in post conviction proceedings). But see Britt v.
North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 230 (1971) (adequate alternative to transcript was available).
83. Griffn, 351 U.S. at 17 ("[O]ur own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations
between persons and different groups of persons.").
The Supreme Court has often not made it clear whether due process or equal protection
analysis should apply in determining the rights of indigent litigants. In the 1974 case of Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974), the Court acknowledged that it had never stated ex-
plicitly in Griffin whether its decision rested on the equal protection clause or the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 823-24
(11th ed. 1985) ("The Court repeatedly has divided on the issue of whether procedural due
process or equal protection analysis provides the appropriate framework for analysis."); Note,
The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigency Preclude Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 703, 703 n.3 (1986) (authored by Mark P. Goodman) (due process affords an indigent
person the right to select his psychiatrist); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Leading Cases,
99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 130 n.1 (1985) (cases after Griffin have not specified which clause of
the fourteenth amendment they are relying on).
84. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961) ("Four-
teenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand
extends as far to each"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (right of an indigent criminal
defendant to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal to a state supreme court). Justice Frank-
furter, in his concurrence, adopted an equal protection analysis. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 12, § 16-38, at 1629 n.2 (Frankfurter's concurrence "did not appear to differ
in theory from the plurality.").
, The Court's language "verged on categorizing the poor as a suspect class for the purposes
of equal protection jurisprudence." Leading Cases, supra note 83, at 138. See infra, note 97
for a discussion of fourteenth amendment classifications.
An alternative to treating wealth as a suspect classification would be to view access to the
courts as a fundamental right, thus invoking strict scrutiny in reviewing state-imposed impedi-
ments to the right. Comment, Ake v. Oklahoma: A Question of Experts, 12 OKLA. CITY U.L.
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The majority gave no indication that it had considered the conse-
quences of striking down wealth discrimination in the context of an indi-
gent's participation in the judicial process. However, in a separate
dissent in Griffin, Justice Harlan, who recognized where this approach
might lead, began a campaign to shift the basis of the analysis from equal
protection to solely due process. Harlan warned that if courts began to
lift economic burdens imposed by the state on the exercise of privileges,
indigents would be able to challenge the payment of tuition at state uni-
versities or the cost of transcripts in civil appeals.8 5 He proposed instead
a due process, "fundamental fairness" approach that would permit the
Court to strike down unreasonable discrimination without having to
abolish all wealth discrimination, as might be required by an equal pro-
tection analysis. 86
In a subsequent case, Harlan distinguished between laws directed at
indigents and those having an adverse affect on them:
The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
from discriminating between "rich" and "poor" as such in the formu-
lation and application of their laws. But it is a far different thing to
suggest that this provision prevents the State from adopting a law of
general applicability that may affect the poor more harshly than it does
the rich, or, on the other hand, from making some effort to redress
economic imbalances while not eliminating them entirely. 87
As examples of permissible laws, Harlan noted a state's constitutional
authority to impose a uniform sales tax or a standard fine for criminal
violations. 88 In Harlan's view, the "State may have a moral obligation to
eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to give to some whatever others can afford."' 89 The proper
approach, according to Harlan, is a consideration of whether a state's
REV. 385, 392-93 (1987) (authored by Marion Ty Rutter) [hereinafter Comment, Question of
Experts]; Comment, Criminal Procedure - Narrowing the Rights of Future Indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Name of Due Process, 16 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 417, 429 n.63 (1986) (au-
thored by Karen Frances Clark). This is consistent with the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (indigents must "have the same opportunities
to invoke the discretion" of the state supreme court to review their case), and Smith v. Ben-
nett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for application for writ of habeas corpus), of applying an
equal protection analysis to the question of access fees for appeals and post-conviction pro-
ceedings. This approach, however, undoubtedly would lead to the same result the Court has
hoped to avoid by employing a due process analysis: the state's obligation to equalize indi-
gents' litigation ability, rather than providing "adequate" assistance when appropriate.
85. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 35.
86. See id. at 38.
87. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963).
88. Id. at 361-62.
89. Id. at 362.
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actions violate fundamental "fairness" using a procedural due process
analysis. 90
The Burger Court's decision in Ross v. Moffitt,91 a case concerning
indigent criminal defendants' right to counsel on appeal, eradicated any
significant promise for using the equal protection clause as a basis for
expanding the ability of litigants to present their cases without regard to
their financial condition. Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, re-
fused to extend the approach or reasoning of Douglas v. California,92 in
which the Warren Court held unconstitutional California's procedure of
appointing counsel for indigent criminal appellants only after a determi-
nation by the appellate court of the efficacy of the appointment. The
Court held that states are not required to provide counsel for indigent
criminal defendants petitioning for discretionary state appellate or
United States Supreme Court review. 93 Rejecting the expansive equal
protection analysis of Griffin and Douglas, the Court held that the duty
of the state "is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately
retained by a criminal defendant.. . but only to assure the indigent de-
fendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly."' 94 In this
fashion, the Court, consistent with Justice Harlan's suggestions in Grffln
and Douglas, abandoned its reliance upon equal protection analysis,
which allowed almost no wealth discrimination, and embraced the more
flexible fundamental fairness test of due process.
In Bearden v. Georgia,95 Justice O'Connor offered a somewhat dif-
ferent rationale for not prohibiting discrimination based upon indigence.
The question in Bearden was the effect of a criminal defendant's failure
to pay a fine and make restitution while on probation. According to Jus-
tice O'Connor:
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's fi-
nancial background can play in determining an appropriate sentence.
When the court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a de-
fendant's level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather
than a classification. Since indigence in this context is a relative term
rather than a classification, "fitting the problem of this case into an
equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally
90, Id. at 363.
91. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
92. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
93. The Supreme Court subsequently has held that if there is no right to counsel for
discretionary appeals, a fortiori, there is no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1987).
94. Ross, 417 U.S at 616.
95. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
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accomplished[.]" The more appropriate question is whether consider-
ation of a defendant's financial background in setting or resetting a
sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process. 9 6
Thus, according to Justice O'Connor's analysis, an indigent alleging dis-
crimination is not entitled to strict or even heightened scrutiny of the
alleged mistreatment by the Court.97
The Supreme Court's due process analysis has meant that it need
not focus on the plight of indigents qua indigents. So long as fundamen-
tal fairness is not violated, any discrepancy between the rights of indi-
gents and those of the rest of society are not constitutionally suspect. In
the context of providing assistance to indigents, rights found under the
equal protection clause are no broader than those found under due pro-
96. Id. at 666 n.8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also G. GUNTHER, supra
note 83, at 829 n.3. Responding to an argument that Griffin and Douglas were based solely on
the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985)
(quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 609), noted that the due process and equal protection clause each
trigger a distinct inquiry: " 'Due Process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the indi-
vidual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated. 'Equal Protection' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State
between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." The Court
concluded that both clauses supported the Griffin and Douglas decisions.
97. The Supreme Court continues to apply varying degrees of scrutiny to state classifica-
tions challenged under the equal protection clause. "Strict scrutiny" is reserved for classifica-
tions affecting a "fundamental right" or those which discriminate against a "suspect class."
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988). Other classifications need only be
"rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose" to survive an equal protection at-
tack. Id. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
"Heightened scrutiny," more demanding than the rational relation test though less demanding
than strict scrutiny, has been applied in cases involving discrimination based on gender or
illegitimacy, as well as children of illegal aliens. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-26 (1982)
(barring a compelling governmental interest, it is a denial of equal protection to refuse free
public education for children of illegal aliens). Cf Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1985) (purportedly applying rational basis test to classification based on
mental retardation, but arguably employing a more searching inquiry in addition to the classi-
fication).
The Court has consistently held that statutes having a disparate effect on rich and poor do
not qualify for strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487 (applicable standard is
rational justification); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980) (same); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (same).
In Kadrmas, the Rehnquist Court held that a state could charge indigents a fee for trans-
porting their children to public school. The facts of the case, however, made the conclusion
easier to reach than it might have been had the parents in the case not employed alternative
methods of transportation for their children, in fact, at greater expense than paying the state
fee. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2485 (over $1000 versus $97 for the bus). A more challenging
factual setting would have been presented if the children had been unable to attend school due
to the fee. That would present a closer analogy to the difficulty faced by indigent litigants in
presenting their cases without expert testimony.
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cess. 98 As a result, "indigent defendants . . . are guaranteed only 'ade-
quate,' not equal, access to the judicial system." 99 Thus, due process has
allowed the Supreme Court to expand the rights of indigents without
relying on an equal protection basis for doing so.
IV. Indigents' Due Process Right to Equipage
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does
not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and
that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has ac-
cess to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.
- Justice Marshall'O°
The Supreme Court appears to have stymied development of a right
to expert assistance based upon equal protection principles. The Court's
refusal to treat wealth as a suspect class or access to the courts as a fun-
damental right means that a constitutional right to expert assistance can
be recognized, if at all, only if it is essential to a "fundamentally fair"
litigation process.
This Article argues that in civil cases when expert testimony or con-
sultation is critical to a successful outcome, the fundamental fairness
query of due process analysis requires that indigents be given the oppor-
tunity to obtain expert assistance. To date, the Supreme Court has not
confronted the question of whether in civil litigation between private par-
ties courts must, under certain circumstances, provide expert witness
assistance to an indigent party. A number of Supreme Court decisions
applying the due process clause to related questions of access and equi-
page costs for indigents, however,- provide some guidance.
Each of the Supreme Court decisions involved a number of vari-
ables, such as whether: (1) the case was civil, criminal, or more properly
considered "quasi-criminal"; (2) the government was, in fact, or in effect,
a party; (3) the request was for access or equipage; and, (4) the expertise
requested was for assistance of counsel. When considered in terms of
these variables, a due process doctrine emerges that supports the right of
indigent civil litigants to expert assistance. The variables most helpful in
analyzing the Supreme Courts opinions are the distinction between ac-
cess and equipage and whether counsel is being sought.
98. Note, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric Expert,
1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 481, 499 n.132 (authored by Dean C. Gramlich).
99. Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law - An Accused's Right to Court-Appointed Ex-
pert Testimony, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 207 (1980).
100. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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The Supreme Court has been very restrictive in providing indigents
access to the courts in civil cases. 10 Beginning in the criminal context,
however, the Court has found a due process right to equipage under some
circumstances. While the few civil or quasi-criminal equipage cases de-
cided by the Court have tended to involve either a fundamental right, or
the state as a party, these cases provide an analytical structure for pro-
viding equipage to indigents in civil suits between private parties. Fi-
nally, the Court has been extremely reluctant to provide counsel to
indigents in civil cases. Thus, civil access cases will be considered first,
followed by criminal and the civil and quasi-criminal equipage cases.
Cases involving requests for counsel, a variation on equipage cases, will
be considered separately.
A. Civil Access Cases
In a two-year period, the Supreme Court considered three signifi-
cant civil cases in which indigent litigants sought to have access fees
waived.10 2 The first case, Boddie v. Connecticut, 103 was decided on nar-
row grounds but held out the prospect of wider application.
In Boddie, a class of welfare recipients in Connecticut sought to
have the requirement of filing and service of process fees in divorce ac-
tions held unconstitutional. The Supreme Court struck down the fee .re-
quirement on the ground that in order to get a divorce it was necessary to
use the courts:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the
means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit
a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its
courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages. 104
101. Of course, barring the theoretical imposition of appearance fees, access is not an issue
for criminal defendants.
102. The Supreme Court has been more comfortable applying an equal protection analysis
to the question of access in criminal cases. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (viola-
tion of equal protection to require an indigent to pay a filing fee to file a motion for leave to
appeal a criminal conviction). Perhaps because criminal defendants are not charged access
fees at the trial level, the Court is not concerned that equal protection will prove to be unduly
expansive in the criminal context.
103. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
104. Id. at 374. At least one state court was willing to extend the Boddie rationale to cover
payment of the cost of service of a summons by publication in divorce actions. Even though
the costs of publication were payable to a third party, not a court office, "[tihe effect of indi-
gency is ... the same in each case-denial of access to the courts-and, thus, we deem the
rationale of Boddie controlling." Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 95, 296 N.E.2d 229, 230,
343 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (1973), quoted in Note, Justice For The Poor? A Look At The Right To
Counsel For Indigents In Divorce Litigation, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 87, 90 (1976) (authored
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Justice Harlan's opinion focused on the state monopoly on granting
divorces and the analogous due process right of a civil defendant to be
heard, 0 5 which treat the divorce petitioner and civil defendant, respec-
tively, as involuntary participants in the legal process. He distinguished
other types of disputes that are capable of resolution without resort to the
courts.' 0 6 Presumably he was referring to private contractual disputes
which in theory can be resolved through settlement between the parties
or invocation of some other method of dispute resolution.
by Richard B. Cohen). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 329 A.2d 451 (D.C. 1974) (litigants'
access to court to obtain a divorce may not, under the due process clause, be barred by finan-
cial considerations); King v. King, 21 111. App. 3d 1062, 316 N.E.2d 555 (1974) (In accord
with Boddie, when an indigent plaintiff seeks a divorce, he is entitled to a waiver of the cost of
service by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.); Monroe v. Monroe, 33 Ohio
Misc. 129, 294 N.E.2d 250 (1972) (following Boddie's interpretation of due process, an indi-
gent is entitled to a waiver or reduction in the cost of service by publication in divorce actions).
105. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376-77. This opinion gave Justice Harlan, a critic of the Court's
prior equal protection analysis, an opportunity to demonstrate how claims by indigents could
be resolved under the due process clause without creating principles that would prohibit all
wealth discrimination.
106. Id. at 376. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, rejected Harlan's monopoliza-
tion theory, noting that the state has a monopoly on all judicial dispute resolution. Id. at 387
(Brennan, J., concurring). If disputes cannot be settled between the parties, the court may be
the only forum available for a binding resolution. Justice Brennan found no difference between
judicial enforcement of rights generally under federal and state law and obtaining a divorce.
Id. The judicial monopolization distinction has also received scholarly criticism:
The court, after all, usually has a monopoly on lawful deployment of remedial force
.... An indigent insolvent person, for example, has alternative avenues to relief
from debts only on the assumption that his creditors are not unyielding. But why
should they yield, since he is indigent and, by holding out, they cannot get less than
they would get out of bankruptcy?
[I]t is apparent that the "monopoly" factor which activates special access rights for
divorce suitors refers strictly to the legal possibility, and not the practical likelihood,
of extrajudicial relief. [T]here is nothing internally illogical or incoherent in such a
notion. Its defect is not that it is unintelligible, but, quite as fatal, that it is unpersua-
sive-that it lacks any external coherence with the context of common understand-
ings within which it arises.... The notion appears to have been conceived by Justice
Harlan for a specific argumentative purpose, that of assimilating the predicament of
the Boddie petitioners to the plight common to civil defendants-a comparison
deemed significant because of an initial assumption that civil defendants generally
enjoy constitutional protection against exclusionary court access fees, the very pro-
tection that the Boddie reasoning meant to extend to divorce suitors.
Michelman, supra note 3, at 1179-80.
Justice Black, in a dissent, commented that because civil disputes generally do not involve
the government as a party and no deprivation of life, liberty, or property as punishment, they
are not entitled to the same level of constitutional protection. 401 U.S. at 391 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the distinction between civil and criminal lawsuits, according to Justice
Black, should lead to the conclusion that divorce actions are not entitled to the same protec-
tion as say, a felony prosecution. Id.
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Two months after Boddie was decided, the Supreme Court avoided
the opportunity to elaborate on the significance of that holding by deny-
ing certiorari in five cases and vacating and remanding two additional
cases that raised issues of an indigent's access to the judicial system. 0 7
The cases involved issues such as the right to file bankruptcy without
payment of the statutory fee and the right of a mother to have counsel
appointed in a child neglect case.10 8
Any hope that Boddie was a portent of future decisions striking
down access barriers for indigents in civil cases quickly faded. Instead,
the Court chose to view Boddie's emphasis on fundamental interests and
on state monopolization of the means for protecting those interests as
limiting factors. 10 9 The Court simply declined to extend Boddie unless
these factors were present.
The first case to consider the possibility of extending Boddie was
United States v. Kra, 110 in which the Supreme Court upheld the Bank-
ruptcy Act's conditioning the right to discharge on payment of a fifty
dollar fee, against a constitutional challenge by an indigent who could
not afford the filing fee. Distinguishing Boddie, the Court held that dis-
charging a debt did not have the constitutional significance of dissolving
a marriage, which the Court considered a protected associational
activity.' 11
107. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955 (1971).
108. Id. at 954-55. Although he had dissented in Boddie, Justice Black wanted to review
these cases because of his view that if Boddie were good law, then it would have to be expanded
to all civil cases. Id. at 954 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas would also have
granted review and reversed, on equal protection grounds. Id. at 960-61 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing ).
Justice Black's interpretation of Boddie was that "no person can be denied access to [state
and federal civil] courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a
bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney." Id. at 955-56. Black rejected the "monop-
olization" distinction in Boddie on the ground that state and federal courts "hold the ultimate
power of enforcement in almost every dispute." Id. at 956. He also rejected limiting indigents
to the right to divorce actions, with the view that "[p]ersons seeking a divorce are no different
from other members of society who must resort to the judicial process for resolution of their
disputes," id. at 954 n. 1, and "the right to seek a divorce is simply not very 'fundamental' in
the hierarchy of disputes." Id. at 957. The only way to provide "meaningful access" to the
courts, according to Black, was to extend the right to counsel to civil cases. Id. at 959 (citing
Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (per curiam)). Justice Black concluded that
counsel could still be denied to indigent civil litigants having frivolous claims. Meltzer, 402
U.S. at 959.
109. According to one commentator, by limiting the holding to cases involving a basic
interest, such as marriage or divorce, Harlan avoided "creating a constitutionally mandated
forma pauperis for civil litigation." Note, Indigent's Access to Civil Court, 4 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 267, 295 (1972) (authored by Michael Klimpl).
110. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
111. Id. at 444-45. The Court also considered whether equal protection would provide
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The Court also noted that bankruptcy, unlike divorce, is not the
only method of accomplishing an indigent's goals: "However unrealistic
the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, and
often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his
creditors." 112
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court in Ortwein v.
Schwab, 113 confirmed that it was moving in the-direction of Kras and
would not extend Boddie. The Court upheld a requirement that indi-
gents pay a twenty-five dollar fee to appeal an adverse decision in a wel-
fare hearing. Finding that the interest in increased welfare payments had
no more constitutional significance than the interest in filing for bank-
ruptcy, the Court applied a rational relationship test and, as in Kras,
concluded that such fees are justified. 14 Since the parties could chal-
lenge the agency's decisions in an administrative hearing, the Court con-
cluded that, unlike the situation in Boddie, the judicial system did not
provide the exclusive means of relief.' 15
any relief. Because the fee requirement pertained to "economics and social welfare," the low-
est form of equal protection scrutiny is invoked-that there be some "rational justification" to
support the government's actions. Id. at 446. A rational basis in imposing a fee, namely to
make the system self-supporting, was found. Id. at 447-48.
Kras was distinguished in In re Sarah Allen Home, Inc., 4 Bankr. 724 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1980). The court held that indigents had the right to file an adversary bankruptcy proceeding
in forma pauperis. The case is analogous to Boddie in that, due to the automatic stay, the
resolution of the dispute had to occur in bankruptcy court. The case differed from Kras in that
instead of seeking to discharge debts, the parties were seeking to protect their property. A
similar property interest is at the heart of much civil litigation.
112. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall dissented on the ground that due process was violated, as in Boddie, by denying
indigents access to the bankruptcy court. Id. at 454. Because debts are only enforceable
through the government's court system, they concluded that only the government can provide
relief from those debts. Id. at 455. In a separate dissent, Justice Marshall castigated the ma-
jority for blithely assuming that the debtor could easily pay the filing fee if given a number of
months, ignoring the reality of the financial condition of those living in poverty: "[I]t is dis-
graceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions
about how people live." Id. at 460.
113. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
114. Id. at 659-60. It has been suggested in the context of analyzing Kras, that the Court
has adopted a tautological position, e., that the charging of a filing fee is its own justification:
the Court's position is that "charging [a fee is] rational because it is a financing scheme, not
because it is a fair one." L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 16-51, at 1648-49.
115. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60. In their separate dissents, Justices Douglas and Mar-
shall argue that the litigation in question is the first time the parties will have access to the
courts. Id. at 662, 665 n.*. Thus, the case is distinguishable from the line of cases holding
that, even in criminal cases, states are not required to provide for appeals. See, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (due process clause does not require a state to provide appel-
late review; it is within the discretion of the state to allow such review); McKane v. Durston,
153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("appeal from judgment of conviction is not an absolute right").
Justices Stewart and Brennan also dissented, though without much vigor. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at
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Clearly, the Supreme Court, in the Kras and Ortwein decisions, has
jealously limited access to the courts for indigent civil plaintiffs. Unless
there are no alternatives to the judicial relief available, as in Boddie, free
access will be denied. Under this theory of due process, fundamental
fairness is not offended by the prospect of turning an indigent plaintiff
away from the court because of her inability to afford the filing fee, if she
has another way to resolve her dispute. This is an exceedingly narrow
construction of fundamental fairness. The assumption that disputes can
be resolved outside the judicial system ignores the fact that indigents
often lack the power to bargain effectively with their adversaries. Only
free access to the judicial system can provide either the prospect of litiga-
tion that will encourage adversaries to bargain seriously, or adequate re-
lief when the bargaining process is unsuccessful.
There is nothing inherent in the concept of fundamental fairness
that limits it to fundamental rights. While deprivation of a divorce de-
cree may implicate a fundamental right, deprivation of property may also
be "fundamentally" unfair. Without free access to the courts, indigents
are denied a forum for a wide range of disputes. Yet, the Supreme Court,
perhaps concerned about imposing the cost of litigation by indigents on
society in a time of fiscal conservatism, has chosen to construe funda-
mental fairness narrowly in this context.
Fundamental fairness is not applied to all aspects of legal proceed-
ings, but instead to a court's role in resolving disputes. Boddie addressed
a problem that could only be resolved by the courts; Kras and Ortwein
arguably did not. Once an indigent finds herself in court, either involun-
tarily as a defendant or through a statute or rule which permits in forma
pauperis proceedings, the due process calculus shifts.
B. Criminal Equipage Cases
Indigent criminal defendants occasionally need expert assistance in
the same manner as do indigent civil litigants. The inability to afford an
expert witness' fee may result in a failure to establish a defense to the
crime charged or to challenge the prosecution's case. This problem can-
not arise more dramatically than in a death penalty case.
In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was charged with murdering a couple
and wounding their two children. 1 6 While in jail before arraignment,
661 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("the Court is so resolutely firm in its contrary view that it would
serve no useful purpose to set this case for oral argument"); 410 U.S. at 664 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("no reason to set this case for argument in light of the majority's firmly held view
that Kras is controlling").
116. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985).
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and at his arraignment in the district court for Canadian County,
Oklahoma, Ake's behavior was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte,
ordered a psychiatric examination.1 17 The examining psychiatrist diag-
nosed Ake as probably paranoid schizophrenic and recommended an ex-
tended psychiatric examination to determine whether he was competent
to stand trial. The trial court ordered such an examination. The next
month Ake was committed to a state hospital for examination. The fol-
lowing month, less than six months after the alleged crime, the chief fo-
rensic psychiatrist at the state hospital informed the court that Ake was
not competent to stand trial. Based on the psychiatrist's testimony, Ake
was committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief
forensic psychiatrist informed the court that if Ake remained on the
medication he had been prescribed, he would be competent to stand
trial. 118
At a pretrial conference, Ake's attorney informed the court that he
intended to raise the insanity defense. Despite the extensive psychiatric
examinations of Ake, none had focused on his state of mind at the time
of the alleged crimes. As a result, defense counsel requested that the
court arrange for a psychiatrist to perform an examination, or provide
funds to hire a psychiatrist, as Ake's indigence precluded him from re-
taining his own psychiatrist." 9 The trial judge denied the request on the
ground that indigent defendants have no constitutional right to receive
such assistance from the court.' 20 As a result, no expert testimony was
presented from either side on Ake's sanity at the time of the offense. 12
The jury, rejecting his insanity defense, convicted Ake of murder and
shooting with intent to kill.122
At sentencing, the prosecution sought the death penalty. Presenting
no new evidence, the prosecutor relied significantly on the psychiatric
evidence from the guilt phase that Ake was dangerous to society, in order
to establish the likelihood of his future dangerousness. Ake was unable
to introduce any expert testimony to rebut the trial evidence. The jury
sentenced him to the death on the murder counts and to 500 years' im-
prisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. His
117. Id. at 71-72.
118. Id. at 72.
119. Id.
120. Id. The trial judge based his opinion on United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S.
561, 568 (1953) (holding that it is not the constitutional duty of the state to appoint a psychia-
trist to make a pretrial examination into petitioner's sanity).
121. Ake, 470 U.S. at 72.
122. Id. at 73.
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conviction was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 123
The United States Supreme Court, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 124 reversed his
conviction on due process grounds.
In developing its due process analysis, 12 5 the Supreme Court empha-
sized the liberty interest involved in a criminal case. The Court looked to
the three-part procedural due process test stated in Mathews v. El-
dridge, 126 a civil case:
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the
State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if
the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the
additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safe-
guards are not provided. 12 7
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding involv-
ing life or liberty, the first factor in the Mathews test, was found, in Ake,
to be "obvious" and "uniquely compelling."'' 28 By contrast, the state's
interest in not providing psychiatric assistance to indigent criminal de-
fendants, the second factor, was found to be purely economic and was
given little weight. 129 Also, even more so than in civil proceedings, the
state has an interest in fair and accurate criminal proceedings, and unlike
a private litigant, it has no legitimate interest in maintaining a strategic
advantage over the defendant.' 30
123. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
124. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
125. The Court relied solely on the due process clause to conclude that indigent criminal
defendants had the right to psychiatric assistance in appropriate cases: "Because we conclude
that the Due Process Clause guaranteed to Ake the assistance he requested and was denied, we
have no occasion to consider the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth
Amendment, in this context." Id. at 87 n.13. By basing its decision on due process rather
than equal protection, the Ake Court was able to limit the extent of assistance to be provided to
indigents. Because the right was not based upon an entitlement to psychiatric assistance on
par with nonindigent litigants, the Court avoided having to give indigent defendants a defense
psychiatrist of their own choice. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (state is not
required to duplicate what could be privately retained); Note, After Ake: Implementing the
Tools of an Adequate Defense, 7 PACE L. REV. 201, 238-39 (1986) (authored by Susan S.
Brown). Thus, the case demonstrates that one effect of the move from an equal protection to a
due process analysis is that the right established generally is more limited than it might have
been under extensions of prior Supreme Court doctrine.
126. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Supreme Court considered what procedures
must be followed prior to the termination of claimant's property interest in Social Security
disability benefit payments. '-rior to Ake, the Mathews test had been used primarily in admin-
istrative law contexts. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1332 n.41.
127. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981), and Mathews, 424
U.S. at 335).
128. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
129. Id. at 78.
130. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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The third Mathews factor requires an evaluation of the value of the
psychiatric assistance sought and the risk of error in the proceeding if it
is denied. Because Oklahoma law made the defendant's mental condition
relevant to criminal culpability, 131 psychiatric testimony was crucial to
the presentation of a defense when, as in this case, mental condition was
at issue.132 The Court reached a similar conclusion as to the value of
psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial.133 The Court
held that where a defendant makes the threshold showing that his sanity
is likely to be a "significant factor" in his defense, he is entitled to access
to a competent psychiatrist.134
Weighing the three factors, the Supreme Court concluded that the
trial court erred in not providing Ake with the assistance of a psychiatrist
in both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. 135
Significantly, the Court was willing to examine the trial judge's deci-
sion based on the facts available at the time the psychiatrist was re-
quested, rather than considering whether the testimony would have been
determinative.' 36 This differs from the approach taken by the Criminal
131. Under Oklahoma law, insanity was a complete defense. Ake, 470 U.S. at 73 n.1
(quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 152 (1981)).
132. Judge Cardozo has stated that: "[Upon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or
forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense.... [A] defendant
may be at an unfair disadvantage if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own wit-
nesses the thrusts of those against him." Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167
(1929), quoted in Ake, 470 U.S. at 82 n.8.
133. In Ake, the Supreme Court distinguished its opinion in Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561
(1953) and the decision in McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (Ist Cir. 1951), upon which the
trial court had relied for the proposition that there was no obligation to provide access to a
psychiatrist for an indigent defendant. 470 U.S. at 84-85. The Court noted that in Smith
neutral psychiatrists had, in fact, examined the defendant and testified at trial as to his sanity.
A psychiatrist not bound to the prosecution had examined the defendant in McGarty.
The Court also made it clear that Smith is no longer reliable authority in light of the
subsequent expansion of indigent defendant's rights. Id. at 85.
134. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
135. Id. at 83, 86-87. In the federal system, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1982), provides for "investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate
defense." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1982). The Act, which precededAke, followed the recom-
mendation of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Fed-
eral Criminal Justice. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1327. As a result, Ake-type
issues will only arise in state courts, and only in those states that do not have similar statutory
provisions. See Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by
Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256, 1270-72 (1970); Note, supra note
125, at 221 ("A larger majority of states provide certain indigent defendants with psychiatric
and other expert defense assistance through legislation.").
136. See Case Note, Criminal Procedure - Due Process and Indigent Defendants: Ex-
tending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Expert Assistance, Ake v. Oklahoma, 29
How. L.J. 609, 621-22 (1986) (authored by Michael James Todd). But see United States v.
Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1986) (18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) not violated due to
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Justice Act, which requires a showing of substantial prejudice after the
trial to reverse a conviction due to the failure to provide expert assist-
ance. 137 An indigent's inability to retain an expert may make it difficult
to demonstrate how the presentation of the case was prejudiced by the
absence of an expert. 138
Application of the three-part Mathews test, used in Ake in the con-
text of appointment of a psychiatrist, supports the appointment of other
types of experts in addition to psychiatrists.1 39 Following Ake, the
Eighth Circuit held that the due process rights of a rape defendant were
denied by the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert on hypnosis to
challenge the testimony of the alleged victim, who had been hypnotized
by the police. 140 To date, however, the Supreme Court has not consid-
failure to show cross-examination at trial was less effective than it would have been had expert
been appointed), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986).
137. See Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936
(1975).
138. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result in Ake but, unlike the majority's silence
on the issue, would have limited the ruling to capital cases. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87. As a result,
there has been some uncertainty as to whether Ake applies to noncapital cases. See Williams v.
Newsome, 254 Ga. 714, 715, 334 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1985); Satterwhite v. State, 697 S.W.2d 503,
507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). See also Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
("Ake does not reach noncapital cases"). The distinction between capital and noncapital cases
was rejected in Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2857 (1988):
[W]e [do not] draw a decisive line for due-process purposes between capital and non-
capital cases. To be sure, the defendant's interest in staying alive is greater and dif-
ferent in kind from his interest in avoiding a prison term, but the latter interest, in
our opinion, still outweighs the state's interest in avoiding the relatively small expen-
diture that would be required.
Justice Rehnquist, the only dissenter in Ake, recited in detail the facts of the horrible
crime to conclude that the defendant had not sufficiently raised the factual issue of his sanity to
justify the appointment of a psychiatrist. Ake, 470 U.S. at 90. Even if there had been such a
showing, Justice Rehnquist would not have found a due process violation "merely because an
indigent lacks sufficient funds to pursue a state-law defense as thoroughly as he would like."
Id. at 91. Particular reliance was placed on the fact that the burden of proving insanity was on
the defendant in Oklahoma. If the state had assumed the burden of proving sanity, and if it
had relied extensively on psychiatric testimony, perhaps, according to Justice Rehnquist, an
indigent defendant might have a claim to a court-provided psychiatrist in a capital case. Id.
139. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1338 ("no reason to believe that the Mathews
test would turn out any differently for a pathologist or a handwriting expert"); Note, Criminal
Procedure, supra note 11, at 336 ("the ratio decidendi [of Ake] can be legitimately applied to
fact situations where other forms of expert assistance are sought"); Leading Cases, supra note
83, at 137 (the reasoning of Ake may also support the use of other kinds of experts).
140. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) ("no principled way to
distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2857
(1988). There have been cases in which requests for experts other than psychiatrists have been
denied after Ake. See Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1985) (forensic pathologist);
Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (expert in blood stain analysis),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986).
[Vol. 41
EXPERT ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL CASES
ered whether criminal defendants are entitled to other types of expert
assistance. 14 1
In Ake, the Court shattered the distinction between access and equi-
page, between removing barriers to litigation and providing positive
assistance:
Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of [the cases
from Griffin to Little]. We recognized long ago that mere access to the
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the
adversary process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if
the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making cer-
tain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense. x42
The Court made it clear in Ross that while this does not mean that a
"State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his
wealthier counterpart might buy," 143 it does mean that "fundamental
fairness" requires that indigent defendants be provided "an adequate op-
portunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system."' 44
141. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the United States Supreme Court
affirmed a Mississippi Supreme Court affirmance of a death penalty conviction in which a
request had been made for a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and ballistics expert.
Because there had been no showing at trial of the reasonableness of these requests, the Court
chose not to decide "what if any showing would have entitled a defendant to assistance of the
type here sought." Id. at 323 n.l.
In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Johnson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 35 (1987),
Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that the Court should consider and resolve the ques-
tions of whether and when expert assistance should be provided. Id. at 37. The defendant in
Johnson had been denied the appointment of an expert chemist to rebut the testimony of a
police chemist that the defendant's hair, blood, semen, and clothing were consistent with phys-
ical evidence found in the victim's apartment. Id. at 36.
142. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. See also Judge Frank's dissent in United States v. Johnson, 238
F2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956), vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957):
The best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused person if the
lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense, eg., if the defendant
cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a pivotal missing witness or a necessary
document, or that of an expert accountant or mining engineer or chemist.... In such
circumstances, if the government does not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor
- and represents but an upper-bracket privilege.
See also Frank, Today's Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D. 93, 101
(1954) (not democratic justice to allow indigent to be jailed or executed for want of an expert).
143. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
144. Id. In Ross, the Court held that criminal defendants are not entitled to counsel for
discretionary appeals. 417 U.S. at 616. The Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977), narrowed the application of the reasoning in Ross, holding that prison inmates had the
right to access to law libraries or assistance from persons trained in the law. Because an appel-
late court reviewing a petition for discretionary review is "not primarily concerned with the
correctness of the judgment below," but rather only determines whether the case "raises an
issue of significant public interest or jurisdictional importance or conflicts with controlling
precedents," appointment of counsel is not mandated. Id. at 827. Because such appellants
already have had the benefit of counsel both at trial and on their initial appeal, they are able to
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While the Supreme Court took a highly restrictive view of access in
Kras and Ortwein, 145 it has taken a more expansive view regarding the
question of equipage in civil and quasi-criminal cases. An example is the
Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 146 in which the Court held that pris-
oners had the right to law libraries or other types of legal assistance in
filing both habeas corpus petitions and civil rights complaints. 147
The Court in Bounds, reaffirming its per curiam opinion in Younger
v. Gilmore, 148 viewed its holding as an extension of the right of access of
indigent prisoners to the courts. 149 States not only must allow inmates to
assert their rights, they must "expend state funds to implement affirma-
tively the right of access."' 150 It was "indisputable," according to the
Court, that states already had the economic obligation of providing indi-
gent inmates with "paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial
services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them."',51 The
Court reasoned that affirmative assistance was required because of the
need to conduct legal research before filing a complaint, in order to pres-
ent "meaningful legal papers," or to check and respond to authorities
cited by the state.152
The Supreme Court arguably has addressed the issue of equipage in
a purely civil case. The prerequisite of posting a civil appeal bond could
be characterized as an expense of access to the courts. Since it calls for
payment to a third party (surety), it is also equipage. In Lindsey v.
present their claims adequately pro se using briefs previously prepared for their case, trial
transcripts and appellate court opinions. Id. Thus, the question of an indigent's right to assist-
ance at trial is not precluded by Ross.
145. It appeared that the Kras and Ortwein decisions left Boddie as "a single, unprincipled
exception to the otherwise blanket current rule that indigents have no constitutional right of
access to civil courts." L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 16-51, at 1650 (emphasis added).
146. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
147. Id. at 825.
148. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
149. See, e.g., Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-80 (1974) (right of prisoners to assist
each other with civil rights actions); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 (1969) (right of
prisoners to assist each other with habeas corpus petitions); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 358 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257, 258 (1959)
(right to file appeal without prepayment of docket fees); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20
(1956) (trial transcripts).
150. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823. Contra id. at 834-35 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he duty
of the State is merely negative; it may not act in such a manner as to interfere with the individ-
ual exercise of such federal rights. . . . Prohibiting the State from interfering with federal
statutory rights is, however, materially different from requiring it to provide affirmative assist-
ance for their exercise.").
151. Id. at 824.
152. Id. at 825.
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Normet, s53 the Supreme Court struck down Oregon's requirement that in
appealing eviction actions tenants post a bond double the rental value of
the premises from the time of commencement of the eviction suit to final
judgment.1 5 4 The Court recognized that "discrimination against the
poor, who could pay their rent pending an appeal but cannot post the
double bond, is particularly obvious. For them, as a practical matter,
appeal is foreclosed, no matter how meritorious their case may be."155
The Court concluded that the double bond requirement served no legiti-
mate state interests.156
Although basing its decision on equal protection grounds, the
Court's concern about financial barriers to participation in civil litigation
by indigent litigants has due process consequences as well. As distin-
guished from Boddie, Lindsey involved no significant government in-
volvement beyond providing a forum, and there was no fundamental
interest at stake. There also were no criminal aspects to the proceedings,
yet the Court granted relief to the indigent litigants. The relief, however,
simply eliminated litigation expenses and did not provide any financial
assistance.
The Supreme Court, in Little v. Streater, 157 considered equipage in
the context of a paternity action. After giving birth to a girl, appellee
brought a paternity action with the help of an attorney provided by the
state.158 Appellant, the putative father, through counsel provided by
legal aid, moved the trial court to order a blood grouping test on appellee
and her child.' 59 State law required the movant to pay the cost of such
tests. Because appellant was indigent, the tests were never performed. 160
State law also presumed paternity unless the putative father offered evi-
dence beyond his own testimony.1 61 As a result, the trial court found
that appellant was the child's father.
Departing from the approach in Kras and Ortwein of applying the
two factors discussed in Boddie, the United States Supreme Court in Lit-
tle turned to a civil due process case, Mathews, for a construct to evaluate
153. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
154. Id. at 63-64, 79.
155. Id. at 79.
156. In 1988, the Supreme Court, distinguishing Lindsey, upheld a Mississippi statute
which imposed a 15% penalty on unsuccessful appellants as not being discriminatory and as
more reasonably related to legitimate state objectives than the double bond in Lindsey. Bank-
ers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1653-54 (1988).
157. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3-4.
161. Id. at 11-12.
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the due process claim for equipage. The Court did not repudiate com-
pletely the application of the Boddie factors of monopolization and fun-
damental interest, although this discussion Was relegated to a footnote.162
The Court distinguished Kras and Ortwein and found Boddie analogous
"[b]ecause appellant ha[d] no choice of an alternative forum and his in-
terests, as well as those of the child, are constitutionally significant."'' 63
A unanimous Court in Little found the Mathews elements were sat-
isfied. The putative father's financial interest and the creation of a par-
ent-child relationship were considered substantial private interests.' 64
The likelihood that strong self-interest would color the testimony com-
bined with the conclusive exclusionary value of the blood tests of falsely
accused putative fathers increased the risk of erroneous results without
the blood tests. The state's limited financial interest in not having to pay
for the tests, 165 considering the state's own interest in securing support
for the child, and the fact that such expenses could be taxed as costs to
the parties, 166 led to the conclusion that "the State's monetary interest 'is
hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as
those here.' "1167
In finding a due process violation, 168 the Court stressed the level of
the state's involvement in paternity proceedings.' 69 As a result, the ap-
pellant did not have to assert that the state had a "constitutional obliga-
tion to fund blood tests for an indigent's defense in ordinary civil
162. Id. at 16 n.12. In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988), the
Supreme Court rationalized Griffin, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for habeas
corpus actions), Boddie, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (conditioning appeal of civil
judgments in certain landlord-tenant disputes on posting bond for twice the rent which would
accrue pending appeal), and Little, as cases that "involved a rule that barred indigent litigants
from using the judicial process in circumstances where they had no alternative to that pro-
cess." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488. See also Modjeski v. Carter, prob. juris. noted 108 S. Ct.
2868 (1988) (appeal bond of one and a half times judgment challenged on due process
grounds).
163. Little, 452 U.S. at 16 n.12. Presumably, the only reason appellant had no choice of
an alternative forum was that he was put in the role of a defendant.
164. Id. at 13.
165. These costs were offset by federal reimbursement of 75% of their cost, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). Little, 452 U.S. at 15.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 16 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv. 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981)).
168. Little, 452 U.S. at 17. As an indication of how completely the analysis of claims by
indigents had shifted from an equal protection to a due process analysis, the Court stated in a
footnote that because of the disposition on due process grounds, it "need not consider whether
the statute, as applied, also violated the equal protection clause." Id. at 17 n.13.
169. Id. at 9. The state became a party to the action, had to approve any settlement,
referred the case to appellee's attorney and paid his fee as well as all litigation costs, and will be
the recipient of the month support payments made by appellant. Id.
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litigation between private parties." 170 The Court also characterized pa-
ternity actions as being "quasi-criminal." 171
The Supreme Court's shift from application of the rigid Boddie fac-
tors to the use of the more flexible Mathews elements in deciding the
right to equipage provides the analytic basis for a right to expert assist-
ance for indigent civil litigants. In most civil cases, it is impossible to
satisfy Boddie's strict monopolization and fundamental interest factors.
Civil disputes, especially regarding financial matters, could be settled out
of court. The Mathews elements, which amount essentially to a balanc-
ing test, provide the basis for the provision of expert assistance upon a
proper factual and legal showing. 72
170. Id. at 9-10. According to a constitutional law treatise:
It seems unlikely that the Court would find that, in a truly private paternity proceed-
ing, in which the state had no involvement, the state would have to provide for the
financing of blood tests for indigent male defendants. The opinion noted that the
Court was only ruling on the due process claim of a defendant who faces the state as
an adversary and that its ruling made it unnecessary to consider the equal protection
claim of the putative father in this case.
ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 17.8, at 267 n.35 (1986). See also Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1345
n.134 ("The Streater and Ake decisions could lead to a more general right to expert assistance
in certain kinds of civil proceedings, for example civil commitment hearings.").
Some courts are unwilling to go very far in providing such assistance. In In re Williams,
133 11. App. 3d 232, 234, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1985), the court stated, in dicta:
A respondent in a civil contempt proceeding does not have a constitutional right to
an independent psychiatric examination at the State's expense. Although the United
States Supreme Court has recently recognized such a right in criminal proceedings
where a defendant's sanity is at issue (Ake), the right has not been extended to civil
cases.
The court proceeded to find statutory authority to provide the requested assistance.
171. Little, 452 U.S. at 10. The unusually difficult standard of proof discussed above was
an additional factor. Id. at 10-12.
172. A related issue has arisen as to whether court-imposed witness fees can also be
waived. To the extent that this issue involves the payment of funds to third parties to assist
indigents in the presentation of their cases, it is analogous to the issue of providing expert
witnesses. There is some authority that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982) may provide for prepayment
from government funds of fees that must be tendered a witness who is subpoenaed to testify as
part of an in forma pauperis proceeding. Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.2d 767, 772 n.7 (6th
Cir. 1978) (dicta: if witness is necessary for full presentation of indigent's case, the court could
order government to pay fees), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979); White v. Sullivan, 368 F.
Supp. 292, 293 (S.D. Ala. 1973) (payment of witness fees under § 1915(c)). But see Johnson v.
Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 290 n.4 (6th Cir.) (treats Morrow footnote as dicta), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 917 (1983). Without such prepayment, an indigent would be able to file suit without
having to pay a filing fee, but would be unable to require the attendance of witnesses at trial
due to her inability to tender witness fees when the subpoena is served. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)
provides in relevant part:
Service. A subpoena may be served by the marshall, by his deputy, or by any other
person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena
upon a person named therein shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to such
January 1990]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
D. Equipage as Right to Counsel-The Supreme Court's Hostility
The application of due process to an indigent civil litigant's right to
appointment of counsel should, in theory, provide support for the ap-
pointment or provision of funds for expert witnesses. 173 Both may be
person and by tendering to him the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage
allowed by law.
(Emphasis added.) See also 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) (per diem and mileage charges paid to
witnesses). This does include additional fees that would be paid an expert to testify. The vast
majority of courts, however, have concluded that the term "fees and costs" in § 1915(a) does
not even include basic witness fees and expenses. Note, supra note 7, at 1467 n.26. See United
States Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (no congres-
sional intent to apply § 1915 to witness fees and expenses), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3227 (1989);
Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 290 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983).
Although the outcomes of the following cases were not favorable to the indigent litigants,
they did adopt a due process analysis that would support an indigent's right to assistance in
producing witnesses for trial when the failure to do so would violate "fundamental fairness."
In a civil rights action relating to a convict's transfer from a state hospital to the corrections
department, the plaintiff requested that the court pay the fees and travel expenses of twelve of
his apparently nonexpert witnesses, due to his indigence. 698 F.2d at 288. Because, in the
court's view, the plaintiff had "numerous alternative methods to proceed with his case" with-
out the witnesses, his "right of access" to the courts was not denied. Id. at 289. The court
distinguished Boddie and Bounds as involving "access to the court" rather than "procedures
essential to the trial process." Id. at 288-89. The court separated assistance that is necessary
to presentation of the case from that which is only beneficial. Lacking statutory authority and
finding no constitutional violation, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of the
request, but commented "[ilt is paradoxical to provide an indigent plaintiff with the right to
proceed in court, then deny him a meaningful chance to exercise that right by not providing
him assistance in paying routine costs in so exercising that right." Id. at 291. Judge Swygert,
in dissent, argued that providing the plaintiff witnesses to prove facts was more important than
counsel who would do legal research. Id. at 292.
The Seventh Circuit has held that absent a statutory provision, courts have no inherent
authority to waive witness fees. McNeil v. Lowney, 831 F.2d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1236 (1988). The court in McNeil refused to waive witness fees for an
indigent who was alleging the denial of medical care while he was imprisoned. Testimony was
sought from witnesses who were called because they had personal knowledge of the facts, not
to give exclusively expert testimony. In rejecting the indigent's claim, the court held that the
trial judge had not denied the plaintiff "fundamental fairness in violation of his due process
rights under the circumstances of this case," because: 1) the subject matter of the testimony
was available from other sources, such as medical records; 2) plaintiff had the opportunity to
elicit the information through cross examination at trial; and, 3) plaintiff attended the deposi-
tion of one of the doctors and had the opportunity to question the doctor. Id. at 1373-74. If
the testimony had been "necessary" and alternatives were unavailable, the court might have
found a due process violation.
The approach of the Johnson and McNeil courts was to consider whether a witness was
necessary and how harmful the witness' absence would be to the subpoenaing party. The
decisions suggest that if both criteria were met, then due process would require that witness
fees be waived for witnesses sought by indigent litigants. This same analysis would support the
provision of expert witnesses as a matter of due process when those same criteria were met.
173. The idea of appointing counsel to assist indigents in civil cases is not novel. In the
late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries in England, litigants who informed the court that
they could not afford lawyers were assigned counsel. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil
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categorized as equipage hs they are costs paid to a third party to provide
a litigation service that the indigent cannot afford. Both, in appropriate
cases, can help the litigant in a variety of ways, such as case investiga-
tion, preparation, settlement discussions, and trial, if necessary. Both
provide the type of service that a wealthier litigant often decides are
worth the expense. There will, of course, be cases in which one form of
assistance is more helpful than the other or where both are needed.
Yet, the Supreme Court has demonstrated hostility to the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent civil litigants. 174 It has denied indigent liti-
Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1326 (1966) [hereinafter Note, Right to Counsel]. Many
other countries have adopted this idea: "Most civil law countries have long recognized Legal
Aid as a public function to be regulated by law. Statutory schemes ... make sure that in civil
as well as criminal litigation an indigent party will be represented by competent counsel." R.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 276 (3d ed. 1970), quoted in Note, supra note 104, at 99.
See O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 1 (1967) (the Swiss Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in civil cases); Note, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 551 (1967) (free legal counsel for
the poor is provided by most industrial nations) [hereinafter Note, Indigent's Right to
Counsel].
174. Indigents need not rely exclusively on a constitutional right to appointment of coun-
sel in federal civil cases because a federal statute gives federal courts authority to "request"
that a private attorney represent indigent litigants:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit
that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor...
(d) The Court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to em-
ploy counsel...
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).
Some courts have taken the position that "request" means that they cannot generally
compel counsel to accept representation. See United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d
796, 798-801 (9th Cir. 1986); Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978). Other
courts have interpreted it to mean that they can "appoint" counsel to serve without compensa-
tion. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989) (unwilling attorney
appointed to represent indigent civil litigant); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir.
1971).
In addition, Title VII provides that complainants in employment discrimination actions
may request appointment of counsel. See Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
Many courts considering the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), however,
especially in civil rights cases, have held that counsel should be appointed only in "exceptional
circumstances." Annotation, Appointment of Counsel, in Civil Rights Action, Under Forma
Pauperis Provisions, 69 A.L.R. FED. 666, 671 (1984) [hereinafter Annotation, Appointment of
Counsel]. One reason is that many requests for counsel arise in state prisoner actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1323 (7th Cir. ,1982) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (almost 16,000 § 1983 suits by state prisoners in fiscal year 1981). Thousands of such
cases are filed each year and, in the 6pinion of some judges, most are lacking in merit. See,
e.g., Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("frivo-
lous cases are the norm in prisoner civil rights litigation"). Not wishing to further encourage
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gants who have been convicted of state crimes the right to counsel in
several civil contexts, including collateral attacks on convictions and
post-conviction relief. 175 In a case decided on the same day as Little v.
Streater, 176 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 177 the Supreme
Court exhibited its hostility to the appointment of counsel for indigent
civil litigants.
In Lassiter, the state sought to terminate the parental rights of Ms.
Lassiter due to her failure to visit her son who had been placed in foster
care.' 78 During this period, Ms. Lassiter was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced for second-degree murder.179 She had begun to serve a sentence
of twenty to forty years of imprisonment. 80 Ms. Lassiter's request for
appointed counsel at the termination proceedings was denied.' 8 '
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that due process is
a flexible, sliding scale concept that only can be defined in the context of
time, place, and circumstance. Rather than being capable of precise
definition:
the phrase expresses the requirement of "fundamental fairness," a re-
quirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.
Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise
that must discover what "fundamental fairness" consists of in a partic-
ular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by
assessing the several interests that are at stake. 182
such actions and tax the limited resources of the local bars around the country, courts have
been reluctant to appoint counsel in those cases. Annotation, Appointment of Counsel, supra,
at 670. See also McKeever, 689 F.2d at 1325 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("There are not enough
lawyers in America to satisfy prisoners' demands for free legal counsel; those demands are
insatiable.").
175. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553 (1987); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
488 (1969) (no general obligation to appoint counsel for prisoners seeking post-conviction re-
lief). But see Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (no right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings challenging death penalty), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988). Cf
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (prisoners have no right to appointment of counsel to
file petitions for discretionary relief).
176. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). See section IV(C), supra.
177. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
178. Id. at 20-21.
179. Id. at 20, n.1.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 22. Interestingly, at the hearing Lassiter did not allege that she was indigent.
Id. Yet, on appeal she argued that "because she was indigent" certain of her rights had been
violated. Id. at 24. No mention is made of this disparity either by the United States Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. See In Re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259
S.E.2d 336 (1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
182. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-25. This flexible, open-ended approach was criticized by
Justice Douglas in his concurrence in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 384 (197 1). Prefer-
ring an equal protection analysis that provides clearer guidelines, Justice Douglas found the
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Before applying its due process analysis, the Court created a rebut-
table "presumption against the right to appointed counsel" in civil cases
in which no loss of liberty would result. 183 An examination by the Court
of its precedents led to the conclusion that the right to counsel is directly
related to the "liberty" interest involved. As a result, when a criminal
defendant is to be sentenced to prison, there is an absolute right to coun-
sel. 184 This is not based on a criminal defendant's right to counsel under
the sixth and fourteenth amendments but rather to a due process liberty
interest.185 As the liberty interest decreases, so does the right to
counsel. 186
Although precedent regarding protection of liberty interests was
clear, the Court did not explain why a due process right to counsel should
exist only when deprivation of a liberty, as opposed to a property, inter-
est is involved. Deprivation of an indigent's property rights, for instance
the right to remain in an apartment or maintain possession of essential
household belongings, may be more significant than a minor intrusion on
an indigent's liberty interest. Ironically, the Lassiter Court employed the
Mathews factors that arose in a case involving protection of a social se-
curity recipient's property rights. 1 87 There is no apparent reason why
procedural protections are not required when property or liberty are at
stake, but in the Court's view counsel is required only when liberty is at
stake.
The rebuttable presumption against appointment of counsel in
Lassiter was weighed against the three-part Mathews factors.1 81 Despite
a conclusion that the parent's interests in the termination proceeding are
great, the state's financial interests weak, and the value of counsel often
significant, the Court declined to adopt a per se rule finding the rebutta-
ble presumption against appointment of counsel overcome in such
cases.' 89 Instead, the Court chose to adopt a case-by-case balancing ap-
due process test "highly subjective and dependent on the idiosyncracies of individual judges."
Id. at 385.
183. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 25; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
185. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (notification of right to
be represented by counsel and appointment of counsel if unable to afford one required in juve-
nile commitment proceedings even though styled a "civil" proceeding).
186. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (mere
threat of imprisonment not enough to require appointment of counsel); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 789-90 (1973) (no per se right to counsel in parole revocation hearing).
187. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
188. The Lassiter opinion did not mention Boddie, and the Little opinion did so only in a
cursory fashion, suggesting the preeminence of the Mathews factors.
189. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. It has been suggested that the reason for the outcome in
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proach by trial courts, 190 subject to appellate review. 191 In Lassiter, the
Court held, because the trial had not been particularly complex, 92 and
because Ms. Lassiter had not demonstrated a strong interest in the pro-
ceedings, 93 the trial court's decision not to appoint counsel should be
affirmed. 194
Lassiter was the "singularly unsympathetic facts of the case." L. TRIE, supra note 12, § 16-
51, at 1652. Lassiter's failure to appear at the 1975 custody hearing, lack of contact with her
son, and murder conviction, demonstrating her lack of fitness as a mother, seemed to weigh
heavily on the justices' minds. Id.
190. Despite the Court's preference for a case-by-case approach, at least one trial court has
concluded in a habeas corpus proceeding, after considering the Mathews factors, that there is a
right to counsel in all state civil contempt hearings to show cause why one who has been
convicted and failed to pay a fine should not be committed. Colson v. Joyce, 646 F. Supp. 102,
108 (D. Me. 1986), aff'd, 816 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1987). But see Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512, 518
(5th Cir. 1983) ("Our function is not to question the wisdom of the Lassiter opinion, but rather
to apply it straightforwardly."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984).
191. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, dissented, criticizing the majority for adopting in the civil context the same case-by-case
approach that had been employed in the criminal context in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), only to be later rejected in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963), with the
conclusion that a fair criminal trial required counsel. 452 U.S. at 36. The dissenters would
apply the Mathews test to a class of cases, such as termination of parental rights proceedings,
to determine whether there was a right to counsel in all such cases. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's view was that the Court's approach would result
in an increased number of appeals resulting in increased federal interference in state proceed-
ings. Id. at 51.
In 1966, one commentator predicted that the Court would adopt a Betts special circum-
stances approach in the civil context to the right to counsel and eventually move toward a
"Gideon" absolute approach. Note, Right to Counsel supra note 173, at 1339.
The dissent acknowledged that in a termination of parental rights proceeding brought by
a private party rather than the state that "application of the three [Mathews v.] Eldridge fac-
tors might yield a different result with respect to the right to counsel." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 42
n.9. Significantly, the right to counsel in such private civil litigation was not ruled out.
192. No expert testimony had been offered and no troublesome points of law were raised.
The Court did concede that an attorney could have improved the defense and objected to the
admission of certain evidence against Lassiter. Id. at 32-33.
193. She had declined to appear at a 1975 child custody hearing. Id. at 33.
194. Lower court decisions often begin: "Of course, there is no constitutional right to
appointed counsel in civil cases." Tripati v. Polland, 610 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 (E.D. Wis.
1985). See also Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (court
denied plaintiff's claim of ireffective assistance of counsel when although counsel was court-
appointed, counsel was not constitutionally required in plaintiff's case). This, however, is the
starting point, not the conclusion of the analysis of the right to counsel. The decisions con-
tinue to state that the denial of a request for counsel will be overturned on appeal if it would
"result in fundamental unfairness impinging on due process." Tripati, 610 F. Supp. at 1949.
See also Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978) (Although appointment of
counsel was not required, the court stated that "it is extremely helpful to the court to have the
plaintiff represented by counsel .. "); LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir.
1967) (habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings). Implicitly, in some circumstances, there is a
constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in civil cases. In Jeffries v. Reed, 631 F.
Supp. 1212, 1217 (E.D. Wash. 1986), the court held that a prisoner had no constitutional right
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Since Lassiter, many courts have had an opportunity to consider
whether there is a constitutional right to appointment of counsel in civil
cases. When a fundamental deprivation of liberty is threatened in civil
proceedings, such as civil contempt and commitment proceedings, courts
have held that there is a right to counsel. 195 Similar categories include
paternity proceedings, 196 and termination of parental rights cases.197
The reasoning in these cases is similar to that employed in paternity
cases, 198 namely that it is unfair to unleash the state's resources as an
adversary against an indigent without counsel. 199 The same reasoning
could be extended to other similar types of proceedings, such as child
abuse and adoption.200 The Court has taken a more restrictive view of a
right to counsel when only property interests are involved.
While not employing a rebuttable presumption, the Supreme Court
in Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors20° nonetheless
refused to strike down the ten dollar limitation on fees that could be paid
an attorney representing a veteran seeking Veteran's Administration ben-
efits in certain types of cases. The district court, after applying the Ma-
thews factors, had concluded that the fee limitation was
unconstitutional.20 2 In itself applying the Mathews factors, the Supreme
to appointed counsel to challenge prison conditions, but "lack of access to such legal assistance
could state a constitutional violation if it resulted in denial of access to the courts."
195. See McKinstry v. Genesee County Circuit Judges, 669 F. Supp. 801, 804 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (constitutional right to counsel in civil contempt proceeding based on Lassiter); Note,
The Indigent Defendant's Right To Court-Appointed Counsel In Civil Contempt Proceedings
For Nonpayment Of Child Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 326 (1983) (authored by Robert
Monk); Annotation, Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Husband or Wife in Action for Di-
vorce or Separation, 85 A.L.R.3d 983, 985 (1978).
196, State ex reL Cody v. Toner, 8 Ohio St. 3d 22, 24, 456 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1983) (viola-
tion of federal and state due process clauses), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984). See Reynolds
v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 801 (Alaska 1977) (based on state due process clause); Salas v.
Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226, 231, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533 (1979) (unfair if state is
adversary or mother is represented by state), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979); Artibee v.
Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 57, 243 N.W.2d 248, 249 (1976) (treated as quasi-
criminal action); Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Paternity Suit to Have Assistance
of Counsel at State Expense, 4 A.L.R.4th 363, 366 (1981); cf. State v. James, 38 Wash. App.
264, 686 P.2d 1097 (1984) (allowed if counsel would make a "determinative difference"); con-
tra Franks v. Mercer, 401 So. 2d 470, 472 (La. App. 1981) (no criminal consequences in-
volved); State v. Green, 277 N.C. 188, 193, 176 S.E.2d 756, 760 (1970) (paternity is not a
crime).
197. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 602-04 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052
(1981).
198. See discussion supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
199. Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant to Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for In-
voluntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141, 1148-50 (1977).
200. Id. at 1155-63.
201. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
202. Id. at 321-26.
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Court took the opportunity to devalue the role of lawyers in concluding
that their absence would not significantly affect the outcome of these
cases. Despite some evidence that claimants with lawyers had higher
success rates than those with veteran's organizations representatives or
no representative at all,20 3 the Court found that lawyers made the pro-
ceedings more adversarial, complex, administratively costly, time con-
suming, and confusing. 2° 4 This view led to the inevitable conclusion that
the fee limitation did not violate due process.20 5
Considering Ake, Lassiter, Little, and Walters together, it appears
that in cases in which claims are made for equipage based on due process
the Supreme Court has applied the Mathews factors, with a rebuttable
presumption against or hostility toward providing assistance only in
those cases in which the appointment of counsel is sought. 20 6 A more
even-handed application of the Mathews factors is made to noncounsel
equipage claims.
E. Indigents' Due Process Right to Expert Assistance
The applicability of due process to indigent civil litigants' request
for expert assistance is subject to at least two modes of analysis. The first
is that by virtue of being a litigant in federal or state court, due process
provides protection and the Mathews factors determine the amount of
protection to be provided. A second view is that participation in the
litigation process is not enough state involvement to invoke constitu-
tional protection. Under this view, only when the state's degree of in-
volvement and responsibility is sufficient do the Mathews factors attach.
Only when the state involvement test is satisfied do the Mathews factors
determine to what extent indigent litigants are entitled to equipage. Both
views are considered in this section.
(1) Access Versus Equipage
When divided according to access versus equipage claims, an ironic
pattern emerges from the Supreme Court's decisions addressing indi-
gents' due process right to participate in the judicial process. The Court
is far more willing to provide equipage than access. After the expansive
language in Boddie regarding justice and the disparity in litigants' ability
203. Id. at 331.
204. Id. at 325-26.
205. Id. at 334.
206. See Note, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: What It Means for the Indigent
Divorce Litigant, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 969, 974 n.47 (1982) (authored by Peter E. Van Runkle)
("Little indicates that the Lassiter presumption is inapplicable to cases in which the right to
counsel is not at issue.").
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to obtain it based on their wealth, it would seem a natural extension to
conclude that indigents in civil cases have a broad right of access to the
courts. Instead, the Court in Kras and Ortwein, implied that indigents
have no general right to have access barriers removed. The Court's view
is that inability to pay access fees can result in indigents' inability to
litigate civil claims without violating the Constitution.
From a policy perspective, it might be argued that it makes no sense
to deprive low income people facing economic difficulties the ability to
get a fresh financial start because they cannot afford the bankruptcy filing
fee.20 7 But from the perspective of constitutional jurisprudence, a com-
plete right of access for indigent civil litigants would come dangerously
close to a "regression" to an equal protection approach in the context of
wealth discrimination. Justice Harlan's concerns have led to a narrow
application of due process in this context. Boddie's dual requirements of
monopolization and fundamental interest screen out all but the most
egregious access cases.
In the equipage context the Supreme Court clearly has demon-
strated hostility to requests for appointment of counsel, even to the ex-
tent, in civil cases, of creating a presumption against it. In a sense, a de
facto presumption against counsel exists in the criminal context as well,
overcome only in cases in which liberty is actually, not theoretically,
threatened. According to the Supreme Court, in criminal cases "as a
litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to ap-
pointed counsel. ' 208 The sixth and fourteenth amendments, as inter-
preted by the Court, only require counsel where an indigent criminal
defendant is sentenced to jail.20 9 Counsel is not even required when the
potential of imprisonment was present but not ultimately imposed.210
The decisions give no clear reasons for this hostility. One possibility
is a concern similar to the equal protection concerns expressed above.
Since counsel is arguably helpful in virtually every case, this view of due
process could mean that indigent civil litigants would have the right to
counsel in virtually every case. The sixth amendment mandates this in
certain criminal cases. In the absence of a similar mandate in the civil
context, the Court is unwilling to impose such a costly requirement.
Given the reluctance to provide legal services and the cutbacks in fund-
207. In fact, federal and state legislatures have enacted provisions that allow indigents to
proceed in forma pauperis in many civil proceedings. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982); ILL.
ANN. STAT. 110, 5-105 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
208. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981).
209. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
210. Id. at 373.
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ing for the Legal Services Corporation, a requirement of counsel would
cut against current political sentiment. The perception that such a right
would benefit prisoners who file, in the view of some judges, a huge
number of civil rights suits, many of which lack merit, may also be a
factor.
The right to equipage assistance in civil and criminal cases not in-
volving appointment of counsel appears to be expanding. 21' In the crimi-
nal context, when the indigent criminal defendant has no choice about
participation in the proceeding, the right to equipage, in the form of ex-
pert assistance is clearer. The Supreme Court started with a capital case,
Ake, in establishing a due process right to equipage assistance upon a
proper showing, but its reasoning is not limited by the type of case. In
the civil arena, both Bounds and Little provide a positive framework for
evaluating equipage claims.
The prospects for equipage claims in the future are encouraging.
First, by definition, the claimant already has made it into court. The
concerns about the consequences of widespread access are no longer
present. Equipage claims are limited more easily than requests for coun-
sel. Counsel may be helpful in every case, but a psychiatrist or housing
expert is not. Their need is more fact and law specific. Trial courts can
be delegated discretion to balance the Mathews factors present in each
case.
In addition, provision of experts is consistent with due process doc-
trine on the treatment of litigants. There may be no due process right to
participate in certain procedures, such as appeals, but once the state cre-
ates the procedure, it must accord due process to those who are able to
participate in it.212 Likewise, there may be no right of access to the civil
courts, but, once the indigent litigant finds herself in court, she is entitled
to "fundamental fairness." The Court, while quite willing to deny claims
211. It has been suggested that the right to expert assistance should exist in all cases in
which there is a right to counsel. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1342-45. Conceding
that there may be instances in which expert assistance is more important than counsel, it is
hard to argue that "the right to expert assistance is more fundamental that the right to coun-
sel" and as a result the reach of Ake should be so limited. Id. at 1345 n.133.
212. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (no constitutional right to a crimi-
nal appeal, but once appellate system is established must accord procedural due process);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (no right to appeal; but if granted subject to consti-
tutional limitations); Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 659, 677 (1988) (authored by Julie M. Bradlaw) ("government may not be re-
quired to give litigants access to court, [but] once it does grant access, the procedures used
must comport with due process"); see also Brown v. Dodd, 484 U.S. 874, 876-77 (1987) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (due process requires that an expert witness appointed to an indigent
criminal defendant be competent).
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to access, has yet to deny an equipage claim not dealing with appoint-
ment of counsel.
The Mathews test, employed in the later due process cases, provides
an ideal way to segregate only the most needy cases for due process relief,
while at the same time providing assistance in more cases than under the
Boddie monopolization and fundamental interest standard. The fact that
the Supreme Court has shifted from a Boddie to a Mathews approach
indicates that it views equipage claims more expansively than access re-
quests. The cost-benefit approach in the Mathews test is questionable in
an inquiry to determine fundamental fairness and has been criticized;213
however, it is particularly appropriate to the determination of when ex-
penditures for expert assistance for indigents are required. A litigant's
decision whether to employ an expert in a civil case is an economic one.
Integrating economic factors into the due process calculus in this context
is sensible. Fundamental fairness in the context of property rights can
appropriately take into account economic factors.
There are few reported decisions that have considered whether an
indigent civil litigant has a due process right to expert assistance. In
Cagle v. Cox, 21 4 inmates alleged that the conditions under which they
were being confined violated the constitution. 215 They requested authori-
zation to retain several experts on prisons at a cost not to exceed 7,000
dollars, or in the alternative that such expenses be taxable as costs at the
conclusion of their case.216 The district court denied the requested au-
thorization, despite the acknowledgment that the "expert testimony will
be indispensable to the plaintiff's counsel in presenting this case, ' 217 on
the ground that it lacked authority "to commit federal funds to under-
write the necessary expenses of an indigent civil litigant's action. '218 The
213. See Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1136-
44 (1984); Note, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: Due Process Takes an Ad Hoc
Turn-What's a Parent To Do?, 59 DEN. L.J. 591, 604 (1982) (authored by Rayma Skeen)
("creates the seductive illusion that the analysis is objective"). In fact, the economic balancing
in Mathews probably is more appropriate to the determination of when the expense of experts
should be assumed by the court than what procedural protections should be afforded in admin-
istrative proceedings, the application in the Mathews case. There are considerable
noneconomic values to providing procedural rights. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46-57 (1976).
214. 87 F.R.D. 467 (E.D. Va. 1980).
215. Id. at 472.
216. Id. at 468.
217. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). See also Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d
Cir. 1987) (no statutory authority to pay for expert witness for indigents), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1298 (1988). The court in Cagle went on to approve taxing expenses of the experts as costs
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court did not engage in a due process analysis though it did acknowledge
that "indigents should have meaningful access to the courts. '219 The
case suggests that the court was frustrated by its inability to provide es-
sential assistance to indigent civil litigants. The Supreme Court could
provide an interpretation of due process that would allow courts to grant
such assistance.
Setting aside the Supreme Court's hostility to the right to counsel
for indigents in civil cases, the arguments supporting appointment of
counsel for indigent civil litigants also support appointment of expert
witnesses. In Merritt v. Faulkner,220 the Seventh Circuit considered the
denial of a request for counsel in a suit for violation of an indigent pris-
oner's eighth amendment rights, due to poor medical care in prison. Spe-
cifically, the prisoner suffered problems with his eye that he attributed to
lack of treatment and mistreatment. The case was reversed, based on the
factors noted above, including consideration of the merits of the claim,
inability of the indigent to investigate, the potential benefit of counsel, the
difficulty with which the indigent might present her own case, and com-
plexity of the issues.221 The court concluded that in some civil cases,
"meaningful access requires representation by a lawyer. ' 222 The same
could be said about the availability of expert witnesses. 223
in the event plaintiffs prevailed, finding the $7,000 to be "reasonable." Cagle, 87 F.R.D. at
472. This probably would be an incorrect ruling after the Supreme Court's decision in Craw-
ford Fitting prohibiting the taxing of expert witness fees. See section II(A) supra.
If the court had been unable to tax these costs, its ruling on authorization to retain experts
might have been different. The court stated that "[w]ithout the authority to tax expert witness
fees as costs, the Court could not assure indigent plaintiffs the same access to the court and
appropriate remedies available to plaintiffs who can afford to retain necessary expert wit-
nesses." Cagle, 87 F.R.D. at 471. It is not clear whether the court felt that "access" had to be
provided by some means. With the removal of the statutory option to tax expert witness fees,
it is imperative that the constitutional due process right to such assistance be addressed.
219. Cagle, 87 F.R.D. at 469.
220. 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
221. Id. at 764.
222. Id. at 763.
223. A debate has been developing over whether counsel should be appointed in cases in
which monetary damages are being sought. The argument, as set forth by Judge Posner and
others, is that the marketplace will provide contingency fee attorneys in meritorious cases, thus
obviating the need to appoint counsel:
Where damages are sought, the prisoner should have no difficulty finding a lawyer
willing to take his case on a contingency-fee basis, provided the case has some merit.
Even if only injunctive relief is sought, he should be able to retain counsel to assist
him with a claim having substantial merit, because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows the court
to award the winning party in a civil rights case a reasonable attorney's fee ....
Encouraging the use of retained counsel thus provides a market test of the merits of
the prisoner's claim. If it is a meritorious claim there will be money in it for a law-
yer; if it is not it ought not to be forced on some hapless unpaid lawyer.
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In Merritt, where medical issues were central, access to an ophthal-
mologist might have been more critical to prevailing than obtaining legal
McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting). See also
Darden v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring) (marketplace should govern); Merritt, 697 F.2d at 769 (Posner, J., dissenting) (fears that
court's approach will lead to appointment in civil cases as a rule). After a remand in Merritt,
the plaintiff entered into a settlement, with the assistance of appointed counsel, that provided
for no financial recovery. Plaintiff then unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the settlement.
On appeal of that challenge, the settlement was upheld and Judge Posner noted that the case
had offered proof of his market theory. Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1987). In
Posner's view, plaintiff's inability to obtain counsel had been for good reason, the lack of merit
in his claim. Id. at 1155-58.
Posner bolsters his argument above by claiming that the marketplace will also screen out
frivolous cases with the added benefit of reducing the federal caseload and preserving judicial
resources for cases with merit. Id. at 1158. One way courts have made use of market theory is
to interpret the "unable to employ" counsel requisite in § 1915(d) as imposing a requirement
on the indigent civil litigant of attempting to obtain counsel on her own before requesting
assistance from the court. See Bunton v. Englemyre, 557 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
This preserves the limited resource of local attorneys for appointment to the cases when the
market will not provide counsel.
Posner's approach has been followed by a number of courts. See, e.g., Sebastian v. United
States, 531 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1975) (appellant made no showing that he could not obtain
counsel), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856 (1976); Lipscomb v. General Foods Corp., 615 F. Supp.
254 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (not entitled to lawyer because could obtain contingency fee representa-
tion; Macln standards not applicable in diversity action); Irby v. Winans, 604 F. Supp. 484,
488 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (inability to find counsel to appoint after nine attempts demonstrates
weakness of case); Seltzer v. Missouri, 517 F. Supp. 1253, 1254 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (motion for
appointment of counsel denied when plaintiff sought substantial damages; court held if claim
has merit, plaintiff should be able to hire an attorney on a contingency basis), rev'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1982); Ferguson v. Fleck, 480 F. Supp. 219, 222 (W.D. Mo.
1979) (same); Allison v. Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271, 273 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (holding that securing
an attorney on a contingent fee basis permits a natural process of elimination of meritless
claims); Rhodes v. Houston, 258 F. Supp. 546, 579 (D. Neb. 1966), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1309 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1970) (same).
The decisionmaking process of the private bar, however, does not always indicate whether
a case is meritorious. There may be a variety of reasons even meritorious cases are declined by
attorneys, including:
-the difficulty of proof. Poindexter v. FBI, 737 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Petete v. Consolidated Freightways, 313 F. Supp. 1271, 1272 (N.D. Tex. 1970)
("Further complicating plaintiff's problem has been the reluctance of the attorneys
she has approached to undertake the specific and complex challenges of a Title VII
lawsuit which are not common to more frequently litigated areas of the law.");
-unpopularity of the client. Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309
(5th Cir. 1977);
-unfamiliarity with the legal issues. Id; or,
-refusal to even investigate claims without payment of a retainer. Edmonds v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523, 524 (D. Kan. 1970).
Judge Cudahy, who sits with Judge Posner on the Seventh Circuit, has challenged Judge
Posner's law and economics approach to obtaining counsel for prisoners, arguing that Posner's
approach only works for large dollar amount claims. Merritt, 697 F.2d at 768-69 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring). Indigent prisoners may not be able to attract contingency-fee lawyers with
smaller claims for damages, he argues. Id. Another disincentive for a lawyer to accept a case
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advice. Given the importance of pretrial discovery and case investiga-
tion, access to expert witnesses at an early stage can be more helpful than
legal advice. One commentator has noted that "the services of an ac-
countant may be of far greater value to one accused of tax fraud than
those of his attorney. '224
In fact, the Merritt court considered a request for payment for a
medical examination of the prisoner, that presented the issue raised here
of a right, possibly constitutionally based, to expert assistance. Finding
the claim to be "novel," the court concluded it was "unwise" to decide
the issue prior to the new trial it had ordered. 225
under § 1915 is the question of whether the lawyer's expenses are reimbursed. In Moss v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 83 F.R.D. 624, 626-28 (E.D. Va. 1979), the court held there was no
authority under § 1915 to reimburse expenses. The court rejected the argument that this
would discourage lawyers from accepting cases with the response that it was a lawyer's duty to
accept such cases that provided the lawyer with valuable experience.
The difficulty of obtaining private counsel is not limited to prisoners. Employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs have had problems finding lawyers to represent them, even with the pros-
pects of attorney's fees in Title VII actions. See Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1181. As one
commentator notes:
The legal requirements of the poor center in a few areas: domestic relations, housing,
welfare, mental illness, civil rights, credit and collection, employer-employee and
consumer matters .... Most of these matters do not generally involve money judg-
ments of considerable amounts. Consequently, in most proceedings the contingent
fee is ineffective in securing representation for persons desirous of instituting suit.
Moreover, in those instances where counsel can in fact be retained on a contingent
fee basis, extensive problems remain in providing investigation, expert witnesses, and
appeals.
Note, Right to Counsel, supra note 173, at 1324-25.
Posner's theoretical view of the marketplace breaks down in practice. Even if Posner
were correct, the problem of expert witnesses will not be solved by the reliance on contingency-
fee lawyers. A contingency-fee attorney must assume responsibility for an expert's fees in
advance, because it is unethical to retain an expert on a contingency-fee basis. Comment,
supra note 15, at 224; Comment, Contingency Fees for Witnesses, 8 J. LEGAL PROF. 237, 238
(1983) [hereinafter Comment, Contingency Fees]; Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witness in
Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J. 680, 1685-88 (1977) (authored by Michael D. Lowe) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Contingent Fees]; Note, The Contingent Compensation of Expert Witnesses in Civil
Litigation, 52 IND. L.J. 671, 674 (1977) (authored by Reed E. Schaper) [hereinafter Note,
Contingent Compensation]. As a result, even though a contingency-fee lawyer may be willing
to accept an indigent's case, she may be unwilling to 'expend the large sums of money on the
case, in the form of expert witness fees that are required. Comment, supra note 15, at 224.
Once again, either Posner's marketplace breaks down completely or the dollar value of the
claim must be extremely large in order to attract a contingency-fee lawyer.
224. Comment, Assistance In Addition to Counsel for Indigent Defendants: The Need For;
The Lack Of- The Right To, 16 VILL. L. REV. 323, 326-27 (1970) (authored by Dennis W.
Alexander).
225. The court stated that plaintiff was concerned with:
the district court's refusal to order a medical examination by an independent physi-
cian, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a). The primary thrust of the claim appears to
concern the payment of the medical experts' fees. [Plaintiff] recognizes that the
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(2) State Responsibility
There is an alternative rationale for providing expert assistance to
indigent civil litigants even if the distinction between access and equipage
is not viewed as critical. It is to focus on the degree of state responsibility
for the due process deprivation. In this regard, the Boddie opinion can
be viewed as requiring a showing that the state is particularly responsible
for the harm to the litigant before assistance is provided. Thus, the fact
that the litigants in Kras and Ortwein theoretically had alternative means
of resolving their disputes meant that their lack of access to the courts
was not a due process violation. In those cases, the alternative remedies
relieved the state of direct responsibility.
The degree of state responsibility required to invoke due process
protection has not been established. Once the state is found to have the
requisite responsibility, the Mathews factors would determine how much
process was due when the state deprives life, liberty, or property.226
Assuming state responsibility is a key determinant, the range of
state responsibility in cases involving indigent litigants is examined. In
such cases, the state may act as one or more of the following: (1) an
adversary; (2) the source of the objectionable law; (3) an enforcement
mechanism; (4) the provider of a possibly exclusive forum. Each of these
is considered separately.227
Cases in which the state is the adversary seem to present the strong-
est case for finding state responsibility. Criminal cases, such as Ake,
present the clearest analog. Also, when the state is suing to deprive an
indigent litigant of life, liberty, or property, responsibility is clear. For
instance, in the paternity action in Little, the state, inter alia, was a party.
The Court applied the Mathews factors and held that equipage in the
claim is novel. It is unwise to reach this issue now. At his new trial, [plaintiff] will be
represented by counsel who has a variety of options unavailable to [plaintiff], includ-
ing depositions and contingency fee or pro bono services by physicians. Only when
these more traditional avenues have been pursued would it become necessary to con-
sider under what circumstances a court can or should appoint a medical expert for an
indigent litigant.
Merritt, 697 F.2d at 767-68 (footnote omitted). The court's suggestion of a contingency fee for
expert witnesses raises ethical questions. See section II(B) supra.
226. The application of the Mathews factors is considered in section IV(F) infra.
227. Some of the cases in which equipage has been granted, such as Bounds and Cagle,
have involved constitutional claims. Although this aspect of the cases was not explicitly stated
as a ground for relief, it is consistent with the fundamental interest factors in Boddie. It is the
independent constitutional violation of taking property arguably without due process, that is
the basis for an equipage claim, and not the underlying cause of action, whether of consti.tu-
tional, statutory, or common law nature.
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form of blood tests was required.228 This analysis also supports a claim
for equipage in suits by indigents against the state claiming a prior depri-
vation. Claims of this type might include an improper termination of
welfare benefits by state or federal authorities.
It may be appropriate to treat the court as the state in assessing
responsibility, at least under some circumstances. The strongest case is
one in which the court, in a civil context, compels a loss of property or
liberty. This is because: "whenever the government enforces private
claims to property of one person against another, it has acted to deprive
someone of his property. 2 29 Thus, judicial action and state action may
228. It was a state law which required the blood tests. The state was also financing the
litigation. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 9-10, 12 (1981).
229. ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, supra note 170, § 17.5, at 234 (1986). Compare
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (private party's prejudgment attachment
was under color of state law because writ was issued by state official) and Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment by court clerk violated due process)
with Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (private sale of goods pursuant to the
Uniform Commercial Code does not constitute "state action" because no public official in-
volved in the sale). Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of restric-
tive covenant constitutes state action).
Many civil suits, such as contract and tort cases, concern only monetary damages. Prop-
erty cases may involve only the ownership of property. In such cases, the protected interest is
often "property" as opposed to "life" and "liberty." The claim may be a speculative, unliqui-
dated one for money damages. According to the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 86 (1972), "[tlhe Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property'... has never been
interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership." See Comment, The Heirs of
Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571,
588 (1973) (authored by Phillip L. Spector). Of course, some civil proceedings, such as evic-
tion suits, involve more than a financial dispute. They arguably implicate liberty interests as
well. Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defend-
ants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 566-69 (1988).
Criminal cases, such as Ake, which involve both life and liberty interests, cannot be distin-
guished from civil cases, even those implicating only property interests, in terms of the need of
indigent parties for expert assistance. As a practical matter, the factual and legal issues in civil
cases are often more complex than in criminal cases. See Merritt, 697 F.2d at 764. Civil cases
raising constitutional questions are especially complex. Id.
From a policy perspective, there is no reason to distinguish between providing assistance
in civil as opposed to criminal cases:
[T]he citizen who permanently loses his home, a government job, a required license,
or unemployment benefits may, in many circumstances, receive a more crippling
blow than the criminal who serves a jail sentence. If vindication is prevented by
financial inability to secure counsel, and counsel is not provided, the resulting harm
is indistinguishable from that suffered by the criminal defendant.
Note, Right to Counsel, supra note 173, at 1333.
It does not follow, as suggested by the Supreme Court's decisions, that the state always
presents the most formidable adversary due to its great resources. Often state attorneys are
overworked and, due to low salaries, not always the best lawyers. Private counsel at larger law
firms may, in fact, have more talent and resources available to oppose the indigent. It makes
more sense instead to focus on the plight of the indigent rather than who is opposing her.
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be indistinguishable. 230
One author, favoring the right to counsel for indigents in civil cases,
argues that due process is implicated in purely private, civil cases:
Someone may retort that it is not the state but another private person
or merely unfortunate personal circumstances that might inflict the
damage. But the government cannot easily wash its hands ...
[D]oesn't the state... violate [the equal protection] clause and the due
process clause as well when a court rules against a poor person without
counsel who couldn't properly present his own case?231
One step removed from direct state involvement is the case in which
state law imposes the requirement of expert testimony in order to prevail
on a claim or defense.232 It is unfair for the state to impose this burden
on indigent litigants without assuming some responsibility for bearing
the cost.
A series of recent cases involving private litigants has taken the no-
tion of state responsibility in purely private litigation a step further. In
these cases, white litigants have sought to exercise their peremptory chal-
lenges in civil jury trials to exclude black jurors, presumably because the
adversary is black and the jurors are expected to be sympathetic. The
Supreme Court, in Batson v. Kentucky, 233 found this practice impermissi-
ble when employed by prosecutors in criminal cases, where state respon-
sibility is clear. The Court has never ruled on a comparable claim in a
civil case. A number of district and appeals court decisions, however,
have concluded that requisite state involvement is present in such
instances.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.234 a black construction
worker in a federal enclave was injured and brought a personal injury
suit against a concrete company. The company challenged peremptorily
two black jurors, leaving a jury of eleven whites and one black. The
district court denied plaintiff's Batson based request to require the de-
fendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory explanation for the exercise of
the challenges. The court of appeals, however, remanded the case for
consideration of that request.235
230. See Botein, Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Civil Defendant: A Constitutional
Right Without A Judicial Remedy?, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 368, 373 (1970) ("Judicial action is
state action, and thus a judgment which deprives a person of a constitutional right is itself
unconstitutional.").
231. O'Brien, supra note 173, at 10.
232. See section I supra.
233. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
234. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), rehearing en banc granted, 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.
1989).
235. Id. at 1315.
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While the plaintiff's claim in Edmonson was based on equal protec-
tion, the court of appeals noted that because the fourteenth amendment
only applies to the states, the claims, if upheld, must be based on the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, which contains an implicit guar-
antee against denial of equal protection.2 36 The threshold question the
court had to consider was whether the private exercise of peremptory
challenges constituted governmental action to which the fifth amend-
ment applied.
The two-part test for state action applied was derived from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 237 The claimed
deprivation had to have "resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority" and the private persons may be ap-
propriately characterized as "state actors. '238 In this regard, the Court
cited Shelley v. Kraemer239 with approval: "[d]espite the fact that a re-
strictive covenant is a contractual arrangement between private parties,
the Supreme Court held that enforcement of such private agreements by
'judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as actions of
the State.' -40 In finding state action, the court noted the intimate in-
volvement of the government in the litigation process, from ordering the
venire to appear, to excusing prospective jurors after a peremptory chal-
lenge is exercised. 241
While the state has direct responsibility to provide and compensate
jurors, it also has assumed responsibility to provide a judicial system.
While admittedly pushing the limits of state responsibility, it could be
argued that a court's denial of an indigent's request for expert assistance
is sufficient to invoke a due process analysis. The government provides
the statutory authority for the case to be heard in court, the courtroom
facility itself, and a judge to administer the case and order appropriate
relief at its conclusion. Unlike the judge's role in implementing a dis-
criminatory peremptory challenge, which is arguably "ministerial"2 42
236. Id. at 1310.
237. 457 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1982).
238. Id. at 939.
239. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
240. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1311 (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14).
241. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1312. See also Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir.
1988) (in dicta, the court stated it had "strong doubts about whether Batson was intended to
limit the use of peremptory strikes in civil cases"). Cf Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155
(7th Cir. 1988) (question left open).
242. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
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and not as a decisionmaker, 243 in denying a claim by an indigent for
expert assistance, the judge is the critical actor.244
It ultimately is left to the Supreme Court to determine at what point
state responsibility for a private litigant ceases. Kras, Ortwein, and
Kadrmas do not suggest that an expansive view will be taken.245
In addition it can also be argued that a litigant has a protected inter-
est in a meaningful opportunity to be heard, independent of the nature of
the cause of action, that is entitled to due process protection. 246 The
courts cannot wash their hands when an indigent has no meaningful op-
portunity to be heard without assistance by an expert witness.
F. Application of the Right
Even if indigent civil litigants have some right to expert assistance, it
still must be determined under what circumstances due process requires
that an expert be appointed. 247 In light of experience with the appoint-
ment of counsel cases, 248 it is certain that indigents will not be given carte
243. Id. at 1312.
244. Despite the lack of judgment exercised, the Eleventh Circuit, in Fludd v. Dykes, 863
F.2d 822 (1 lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub. nom., Tiller v. Fludd, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989), viewed
the trial judge's ruling on a challenge to the exercise of a discriminatory peremptory challenge
as the critical act:
The trial judge's decision-to proceed to trial, over the party's objection, with a jury
selected from the venire on the basis of race-is the one that harms the objecting
party. In overruling the objection... the judge becomes guilty of the sort of discrim-
inatory conduct that the equal protection clause proscribes.
Id. at 828.
245. The Court may well take into account the presence of an arguably fundamental right
in Boddie and the fact that the litigants in Bounds were being held as prisoners by the state in
evaluating the degree of state responsibility required to trigger due process.
246. Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 659, 677 (1988) (authored by Julie M. Bradlone). See, eg., Texaco v. Pennzoil Co., 784
F.2d 1133, 1154 (2d Cir. 1986) (in suit between private parties, imposing an onerous appeal
bond which would effectively deny the ability to appeal violates due process), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
247. One obvious threshold requirement is that the civil litigant requesting assistance be
indigent. To date, legislatures and courts have not generally imposed a definition of indigence
in determining the qualification for proceeding in forma pauperis. The Legal Services Corpo-
ration has adopted an approach to this determination. 45 C.F.R. § 1600.1 - 1611.9 (1989). In
court, the conclusion of indigence is generally left to the trial judge. See, e.g., Cross v. General
Motors Corp., 721 F.2d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 1983) ("decision whether to grant or deny in
forma pauperis status is within the sound discretion of the trial court"). The many possible
variables, such as family income, family size, overall debt, employment status and prospects,
receipt of public benefits, total assets, anticipated future debts, and income, tend to require a
highly individualized assessment.
248. In the future, courts may come to take the position that indigents have the right to
expert assistance on demand in civil cases, much as criminal defendants have the right to
counsel after Gideon. See Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1983) (logic that
January 1990] EXPERT ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL CASES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
blanche in the choice and use of experts. Based on the Supreme Court's
most recent decisions, it appears likely that the Mathews factors will be
applied to evaluate claims for denial of due process in the judicial pro-
cess, including claims for expert assistance. Thus, each of the Mathews
factors is considered in light of a claim by an indigent civil litigant for
expert assistance.
(1) The Private Interest at Stake
In the Supreme Court's decisions applying the Mathews factors, the
private interest at stake has unquestionably been great. In Ake, the de-
fendant's life was at stake; in Lassiter, the loss of parental rights. As a
result, great weight was given to this factor. A right to expert assistance
in the wide range of civil cases with differing private interests will lead
courts to consider closely whether such a significant interest is at stake.
Where nonmonetary relief is sought, such as an injunction to cease a
nuisance or deceptive trade practice, assessment of the interest at stake
becomes difficult. Since litigants often feel strongly about their interests,
an objective test is called for: how would the interest be valued by a
reasonable person under the circumstances? The significance of the in-
terest will weigh heavily in determining whether relief should be granted.
In cases when monetary relief is sought, there might be a tendency
simply to balance the amount at stake with the cost of the expert, the
primary component of the government's interest. Thus, if the amount at
stake is comparable to the cost of the expert, then no assistance would be
provided.
This conclusion fails to take into account the motivation for provid-
ing assistance to indigents: the fundamental unfairness in administering a
system in which indigents cannot participate effectively due to their fi-
nancial status. The Mathews factors also militate against this result.
They are value laden and do not suggest a strict cost-benefit analysis. As
has been noted about the application of Mathews: "[E]ven in its most
empirical moments, the Supreme Court's theory of interpretation does
not adopt an efficiency standard. The Court may talk about 'costs' and
'benefits' to give the impression that some agreed upon common scale is
being used for weighing values, but the Court's analysis is decidedly non-
moved the United States Supreme Court from Powell to Gideon to Argersinger was "no less
compelling" in the civil context of the instant case), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983). As with
Betts in the criminal context and now Lassiter in the civil context, if that is to happen it will
occur over a long period of time. Of course, since counsel would be helpful in almost every
case, whereas experts are only useful in particular cases, it is likely that courts will retain
control over the appointment of experts.
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economic."2 49 The primary economic consideration in the Mathews fac-
tors is the focus on the state's interest. One aspect of the state's interest
is the state's ability to assume the economic burden in light of the utility
of the benefits. The cases suggest, however, this consideration is to be
given relatively little weight. Courts consistently have concluded that
state's can well afford to provide counsel, psychiatrists, blood tests, and
so on. Since expert witnesses clearly will not be needed in all cases, the
economic burden on the state should not be unreasonable.
That is not to say that relative cost is irrelevant. At the extreme, in
a case in which the cost of an expert significantly exceeds the amount at
stake, a court could conclude that it was not fundamentally unfair to
require the indigent to proceed unassisted. This determination could be
affected by the importance of the recovery or defense to that particular
indigent litigant.
For example, in a suit by an indigent against a health insurance
company for denial of some minor claims and cancellation of the insur-
ance policy for filing too many nonmeritorious claims, the risk to the
indigent of future liability for uncovered hospital bills may be great, even
though the dispute over the denied claims may involve a relatively small
amount. The risk in that case may justify an expenditure, in excess of the
amount in dispute, for expert witness fees to obtain a medical opinion.
Especially when the medical opinion would help establish the validity of
the denied claims in order to support an argument that the policy should
remain in effect. Similarly, in a typical contractual dispute over mone-
tary damages, such as an alleged breach of a home improvement con-
tract, the cost of the construction expert, when not offset by other
factors, must be weighed against the likely recovery. Under those cir-
cumstances, an expert charging more than the anticipated recovery can-
not be justified.
(2) The Affected Governmental Interest
The governmental interest in cases in which an indigent requests
appointment of expert assistance is multifaceted. 250 On one hand, the
249. Aleinikof, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 975 n.203
(1987).
250. There may be instances, such as in Little, in which the state is also a party to the civil
action. In those instances, the state's interests will be more complex and perhaps conflicting.
The state may seek to avoid liability but, at the same time, want to ensure that its citizens have
been treated fairly.
It also might be said that the government's interest in protecting societal freedoms by
vindicating constitutional claims justifies increased expenditures. Compare Boddie v. Connect-
icut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) and Ortwein v.
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government has an interest in just adjudication of its citizens' claims.
This interest supports expenditures for experts when necessary to a
proper resolution of the case. On the other hand, to the extent the state
is required to pay expert witness fees, it has a strong economic interest.
In cases in which the other Mathews factors are strong, the court has
concluded that the state's economic interests do not carry much
weight .2 5 1
It is difficult to estimate the cost of providing expert services to indi-
gent civil litigants. The total expense, however, is not likely to be over-
whelming for states and the federal government. Since the number of
civil cases filed nationally approximately equals the number of criminal
filings,25 2 the Supreme Court's analysis of financial considerations in Ake
should provide some guidance. In Ake, the Court considered evidence of
the costs incurred by the federal government and a number of states in
providing expert services in criminal cases253 and concluded that the fi-
nancial burden was not too great.254 No effort was made to estimate the
cost of an expert witness for any individual case. Instead, the cumulative
cost of providing assistance was considered and found acceptable.
While the number of civil filings nationally may appear large, sev-
eral factors will reduce the number of cases in which expert assistance is
sought. First, requests will only be made in cases in which one or both
parties are indigent. Second, as with any other group of cases, many are
likely to be settled or not pursued after filing. Third, expert testimony
will not be helpful or relevant in many cases and in other cases the indi-
gent litigant may be able to obtain expert assistance without cost, or to
have the costs financed by a contingency-fee attorney. These factors
should limit significantly the number of cases in which the court will be
called upon to provide expert assistance.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). One response is that the fairness of the judicial process is a
significant interest as well.
251. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 14-
15 (1981); Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). Admittedly, in each
of these cases the state had a respective interest in fair and accurate criminal adjudication and
the welfare of children.
252. In 1981, in 41 states there were approximately 11.6 million civil cases filed as opposed
to 10.2 million criminal cases. FLANGO, ROPER & ELSNER, THE BUSINESS OF STATE TRIAL
COURTS 68 (1983). In 1986-87, the federal system experienced significantly more civil filings
(238,982) than criminal filings (43,292). ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 6, 13 (1987).
253. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 23-26, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (No. 83-
5424).
254. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79. Comparable figures are unavailable for expenditures for ex-
perts in civil cases because they are not currently provided at government expense.
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One way to mitigate the overall expense to the state of paying for
expert assistance is to require that indigent litigants make some effort to
obtain assistance, either pro bono or at reduced fees, without court inter-
vention. 25 5 Because most expert witnesses do not belong to professional
societies that encourage pro bono service, it can be extremely difficult to
find volunteer experts. 256 Because experts cannot be paid on a contin-
gency fee,257 the market theory does not operate if the indigent seeks only
an expert and not a lawyer. If a contingency fee lawyer is found, the
lawyer might be willing to advance the costs of expert assistance. If the
indigent is ultimately responsible for these expenses in the event she does
not prevail, however, this is not an adequate solution. Thus, in many, if
not most cases, indigents must turn to the courts for assistance if they are
to obtain expert assistance.
Another way to mitigate expenses and ensure that funds are avail-
able for other indigent litigants is to require that the indigent reimburse
the state: a) out of the proceeds, if any, of the lawsuit; or, (b) if the
indigent's financial position changes and she is able to afford
reimbursement.
It is argued that providing indigent civil litigants free expert assist-
ance would give them an unfair advantage over nonindigent litigants who
cannot afford to hire an expert.258 If there were no requirement that
expert witness fees be repaid, indigents' net recovery in lawsuits would
255. See also McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce Litigants, 14 J.
FAM. L. 509, 510 (1975) ("A court then might respond to a post-Boddie request for procedural
assistance with a requirement that the requested service, be it counsel, subpoena power or
stenographer's services, be not only important in a procedural due process sense, but such that
there be no possible alternative means of securing relief.").
In applying 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the indigent's efforts to obtain the needed assistance
through means other than court appointment or payment has been taken into account: "ele-
ments to consider include the likelihood that defense is warranted and sufficiency of psychiat-
ric assistance received from other sources." Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to Expert
Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957, 965 n.73 (1985) (authored by Helen
Hubbard) (citing United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
256. An employee of the Florida Clearing House for Justice noted:
The problem of indigents is magnified by the difficulty of obtaining expert services on
a pro bono basis. According to the director of a Florida volunteer defender organiza-
tion: "Competent lawyers often volunteer their help, but psychiatrists rarely do.
Over the years, I have found hundreds of attorneys who have been willing to volun-
teer millions of dollars of their time to these defendants. I have found only three free
shrinks.. .. "
Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1327 n. 12 (quoting Sherrill, In Florida, Insanity is No
Defense, 239 NATION 537, 555 (1984) (quoting Scharlette Holdman, of the Florida Clearing
House for Justice)).
257. See section II(B) infra.
258. Cagle v. Cox, 87 F.R.D. 467, 469 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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exceed that of nonindigents who had to pay for experts out of pocket.
One district court has proposed that expert witness fees be taxed as
costs. 25 9 The drawback of this approach is that concern about liability
for expert witness fees may deter indigents from bringing meritorious
suits, and may result in a crushing financial burden at the conclusion of
an unsuccessful suit.
The Supreme Court, in Fuller v. Oregon, 260 considered the constitu-
tionality of an analogous recoupment scheme under which a state re-
quired an indigent defendant to repay the costs of her criminal defense if
she was convicted and subsequently acquired the financial means to bear
those costs. 2 61 The costs included not only counsel fees but other ex-
penses incurred by counsel, and paid by the state, including fees for an
investigator. 262
In upholding the scheme, the Court rejected a number of constitu-
tional arguments, including the familiar argument, advanced by Justice
Marshall in dissent, that the scheme constituted wealth discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause.263 Because repayment was part
of the plan designed to provide indigents with counsel, the Court rea-
soned, it followed that only indigents would be affected by it. Therefore,
there was no invidious discrimination against the poor as a group.2 64
The Court failed to consider to what extent it was appropriate to burden
the provision of equipage to which the recipient is entitled. Nonetheless,
if a repayment scheme has been upheld in the criminal context, a fortiori
it can be applied in the civil context as well. 265
(3) The Value of Expert Testimony and the Risk of Erroneous Outcome
Without It
A determination of the value of expert testimony and the risk of an
erroneous outcome without it, the third Mathews factor, necessarily re-
259. Applegate v. Dobrovir, Oaks & Gebhardt, 628 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D.D.C. 1985).
260. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
261. Id. at 43. Under Oregon law, repayment may be made a condition of probation.
262. Id. at 41.
263. Id. at 48 n.9. The majority, however, took the position that because Justice Mar-
shall's argument did not appear in petitioner's brief or oral argument, and was not raised in the
state courts, it was not properly before the court. Id. Nonetheless, the Court chose to respond
to it.
264. Id.
265. See Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 1985) (permissible to recoup
attorney's fees for counsel appointed to an indigent in a civil contempt proceeding), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Smith v. Lees, 431 F. Supp. 923, 927 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (indigent
only liable for transcript if successful on appeal); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939,
942-44 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (court may require plaintiff, whose economic status has changed and
is no longer indigent, to repay costs of multiple suits or face dismissal of those cases).
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quires an analysis of the litigant's claims (their legal and factual basis) in
light of the added value of an expert in establishing the claim. In some
instances, as noted in section I, above, there are claims which cannot
legally be established in the absence of expert testimony. In other cases,
expert testimony practically may be necessary to satisfy the burden of
proof (or prevent the adversary from doing so), but is not a strict legal
requirement. Down the scale is expert testimony that is only marginally
beneficial, even unnecessary. 266
Inherent in balancing the Mathews factors is the notion that expert
assistance should be provided only when necessary. 267 The Supreme
Court, in Ake, suggested a standard for satisfying the third prong of the
Mathews test, namely that the issue on which expert testimony is sought
be a "significant factor" in the case:
A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every
criminal prosecution, however, and it is unlikely that psychiatric
assistance of the kind we have described would be of probable value in
cases where it is not.... When the defendant is able to make an ex
parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be
a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psy-
chiatrist is readily apparent.268
In a subsequent case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 269 the Court elaborated that
the same showing of the reasonableness of the request for expert assist-
ance would be required: "Given that petitioner offered little more than
undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be benefi-
cial,270 we find no deprivation of due process in the trial court's decision
[to refuse appointment of an investigator and fingerprint and ballistics
266. There are, of course, many cases in which only lay testimony is necessary or even
relevant. For instance, a suit by a business against an indigent consumer for nonpayment of a
debt will usually not call for expert testimony.
267. The showing of necessity will go not only toward the need for expert testimony but
the question of how much is needed as well.
268. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985). A related consideration is how impor-
tant to the case is the issue on which expert assistance is sought:
Some courts and commentators have suggested that an expert should be supplied
only when the issue is "pivotal," Le., when it, alone, is dispositive of guilt. See, e.g.,
State v. Green, 55 N.J. 13, 18, 258 A.2d 889, 891 (1969) .... While it is true that
such a distinction may affect the "third prong" of the Mathews balancing test ... it
should not do so decisively. If a given question is indeed at issue in the trial, the
"third prong" interest in accurate determination should still carry sufficient
"weight," together with the individual defendant's interest, to outweigh the govern-
ment's minimal fiscal interest.
Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1357 n. 193.
269. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
270. The petitioner's motion to the trial court only justified his request for expert assist-
ance with the statement that the expert " 'would be of great necessarius witness'." Caldwell v.
State, 443 So. 2d 806, 812 (Miss. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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experts]." '27' The Eighth Circuit has concluded that considering Ake and
Caldwell together: "a defendant must show more than a mere possibility
of assistance from an expert. Rather, the defendant must show a reason-
able probability272 that an expert would aid in his defense, and that de-
nial of expert assistance would result in an unfair trial",,273
Thus, a successful request for expert assistance will require an anal-
ysis of the issues likely to be raised and how expert testimony would
contribute toward development of those issues. The court then should
determine how helpful the expert would be and how harmful it would be
to the indigent litigant's case to forego expert assistance.
There are a number of alternative methods for determining when
experts should be appointed. One is whether a similarly situated private
litigant would have chosen to use expert testimony under the circum-
stances. 274 This is reminiscent of Justice Black's statement in Griffin that
271. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323 n.l.
272. It is not clear what type of showing this entails. According to one commentator:
The Ake formulation could be described as a "presumed need" standard, that is, one
where the defendant's need for the expert is presumed once it is established that a
certain issue will be a "significant factor" at trial. Once the defendant has shown
that the relevant issue exists, no further particularized showing is necessary.
Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1357-58. Courts, however, have taken a more stringent
approach in applying Ake and have required a showing of a "substantial basis" for the defense
raised. Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1054 (1987).
273. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2857 (1988) (emphasis added). See also Moore, 809 F.2d at 712 n.8 (providing expert witnesses
absent a substantial showing of need would place an "onerous burden on the administration of
criminal justice"); Vassar v. Solem, 763 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985) (appointment should be
made "when the facts reasonably suggest that use of an expert would be beneficial to the
accused in preparing his case").
The Fourth Circuit, in a decision well before Ake, employed a similar approach with the
dual requirements that the expert be necessary and that other available methods of proof of the
relevant question be inadequate:
In Jacobs v. United States [350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965)] the court created a two-tier
test by which to determine whether court-appointed expert assistance is constitution-
ally compelled. The first tier examines whether a substantial question exists concern-
ing an issue requiring expert testimony for its resolution. The second tier considers
whether the defendant's position could be fully developed without expert assistance.
If both questions are answered affirmatively, the constitution mandates that the trial
court grant the defendant's request for free expert counsel.
Recent Decisions, supra note 99, at 197.
274. The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1982), provides that indigent
criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of experts "necessary for adequate defense."
Courts, in applying this provision, have adopted a reasonableness standard to the requirement
of necessity. See, e.g., United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976) ("necessary to
an adequate defense" includes expert defense witness); United States v. Shultz, 431 F.2d 907,
911 (8th Cir. 1970) (A trial court should authorize expenditures for an expert witness when
"underlying facts reasonably suggest that further exploration may prove beneficial to the ac-
[Vol. 41THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
EXPERT ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL CASES
"[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets de-
pends on the amount of money he has. '275 The Supreme Court's use of
due process rather than equal protection analysis in this context suggests
that this broad approach is not likely to be employed.
There will be many cases in which it becomes clear, either through
discovery or pretrial conferences, that an indigent's adversary plans to
use expert testimony. Even if a private party opponent's decision to re-
tain an expert is not used as a surrogate for the judge's determination of
need, because it would be reminiscent of an equal protection approach, it
may be that the indigent litigant would, as a result, require an expert to
adequately rebut or challenge the opponent's expert.276
Yet another approach is suggested in Lindsey v. State,277 an insanity
defense case decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia after Ake. The
court suggested a two-step process in which a court-appointed expert de-
termines whether a private expert should be appointed. First, a court-
appointed expert examines the defendant to determine whether "sanity is
likely to be a significant factor in this defense. ' 278 If the examination is
positive, the court must then provide a psychiatrist. While this might be
effective in the limited context of insanity defense cases, it is unduly bur-
densome and costly to require a court to employ its own expert only to
determine whether the indigent civil litigant should be provided with
funds to employ her own expert. The better approach, in light of the
Supreme Court's continued adherence to a due process analysis, is to
place the burden on the indigent litigant to demonstrate the benefit of an
expert in the particular case and the harm that would result if none were
provided.
There might be a concern that judicial time and resources will be
wasted by indigents pursuing baseless claims with court-appointed expert
cused in the development of a defense to the charge."); Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at
1357 n. 190 ("necessary" interpreted to mean "reasonably necessary"). Specifically, the test is
whether a reasonable attorney would, under similar circumstances, retain an expert for a client
with the means to pay. Note, supra note 255, at 965 n.73 (citing United States v. Jonas, 540
F.2d 566, 569 n.3 (7th Cir. 1976)). See also United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th
Cir. 1982) (reasonable attorney would not have retained an expert).
275. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
276. While lay testimony may be adequate in some cases to establish or rebut a claim, it
may not be sufficient to counter expert testimony. A consumer may be able to testify that a
product, such as an automobile, was not working properly after it was serviced. If the repair
shop offers expert testimony that the defect was due to other causes, however, the only effec-
tive response would be expert testimony.
277. 254 Ga. 444, 330 S.E.2d 563 (1985).
278. Comment, Ake v. Oklahoma: A Question of Experts, 12 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 385,
397 (1987) (authored by Marian Ty Rutter) (quoting Lindsey, 254 Ga. at 449, 330 S.E.2d at
566-67).
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witnesses. It would be appropriate for courts to consider the merits of
asserted claims in determining the necessity for expert assistance. In the
context of considering a right to counsel in civil cases, one commentator
has suggested that such a right should not include the right to assert
frivolous claims through a publicly furnished attorney.279 The commen-
tator suggests that some screening mechanism be established consisting
of either a bar committee, a panel of judges, or some combination of the
two, to determine whether the asserted claim or defense is frivolous.280
It would be most efficient to leave this decision to the discretion of the
trial judge.
There is also the question at what stage in the proceedings the ex-
pert should be appointed. A case can be made for expert assistance in
drafting the complaint. Early appointment of experts might lead to
fewer complaints being filed, if the expert can inform the indigent litigant
that the factual arguments or conclusions in the contemplated case lack
merit. 28 1 An indigent litigant may need at least some expert assistance in
making the case to the court that expert assistance is needed. It might be
useful to provide some amount of expert assistance to indigents automat-
ically, as is done under the Criminal Justice Act.282 This initial expense
could be a cost-effective means of preserving judicial resources by elimi-
nating or refining claims at an early stage. The value of an expert goes
beyond testifying at trial. As most civil cases are resolved prior to
trial,283 an expert witness can provide invaluable assistance to an indigent
in evaluating her claim and assessing settlement offers. Experts, even if
they do not ultimately testify, can help in trial preparation. In applying
the test of need for an expert, it is important to keep these other uses in
mind.
(4) How Is the Expert to be Chosen?
After it has been decided that an indigent is entitled to expert assist-
ance, the practical question arises of how to choose the expert. The
Supreme Court's opinion in Ake made it clear that indigents do not have
the right to an expert of their own choosing.284 This is not to say that
279. Note, Right to Counsel, supra note 173, at 1337.
280. Id. at 1337 n.94.
281. Clearly assistance by appointed counsel, if available, would be invaluable at this
stage.
282. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(2) (1982) ($150 of threshold funds).
283. See Pieras, Judicial Economy and Efficiency Through the Initial Scheduling Confer-
ence: The Method, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 943, 943 (1986) (author's experience as a federal judge
consistent with statistic that only six percent of the civil cases filed in federal court are tried).
284. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985):
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courts could not allow indigents to select their own experts, at least sub-
ject to the approval of the court.285
An alternative would be for the court to develop a list of acceptable
experts and have the indigent propose one or more names for the court's
approval or reserve the right at least once to reject the court's choice.286
Although this is feasible in standard criminal cases, it might be a prob-
lem in civil cases because the types of expert witnesses used in civil cases
are so varied that it would be difficult for the court to maintain such a
current list.287
A third approach would be the creation of panels to choose experts.
This has been proposed in the context of appointing psychiatrists for de-
fendants in criminal cases:
Under a panel-type approach, the prosecution and the defense would
each appoint a psychiatrist to serve on a panel. The two appointed
psychiatrists would then in turn agree on a third psychiatrist to assist
the defense. If the two members of the panel cannot reach an agree-
ment, then each member must submit a name to the court. The court
will then act as a tie-breaker and choose one of the two submitted
names.
288
It is worth examining, in this regard, the application of 28 U.S.C.
section 1915, the federal statute which gives judges authority to "re-
quest" that private attorneys represent indigent litigants. The standards
that have developed for applying section 1915(d) can provide some gui-
dance in determining when and how to appoint expert witnesses in civil
cases. Many of the same problems and concerns are likely to arise.
This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to
choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our
concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist...
and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the States the decision on
how to implement this right.
Id
285. The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard § 7-3.3(a)
(1984) calls for the provision of a mental health expert "selected by the defendant." See Note,
Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1357 n. 189 ("simplest solution would be to permit the de-
fendant to choose his expert, subject only to court control of the expert's qualifications and her
fee").
286. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1357 n.189.
287. Indigent civil litigants might need plumbing experts in home improvement cases, psy-
chiatric experts in child abuse cases, or automotive mechanic expertise in a case against an
automobile repair shop.
288. Comment, supra note 278, at 412. Consistent with this approach:
Ohio and Arizona, for example, have statutory provisions which allow the court to
appoint a panel of experts to examine the defendant. [ARIz. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4013 (1978); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1982).] Both states permit the
state and the defendant to name their respective choices to the panel.
Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 11, at 337-3 8.
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While there is no right to automatic appointment of counsel under this
provision,289 appellate courts have held that it is error for the trial court
not to consider explicitly a number of relevant factors, 290 which in-
clude:291 1) the type and complexity of the case;29 2 2) the ability of the
litigant to present the case;293 3) the ability of the litigant to investigate
the case adequately; 294 and, 4) whether the evidence would consist in
large part of conflicting testimony that would require skill in presentation
and extensive cross-examination. 295 The merits of the claim also are con-
sidered an important factor.29 6
(5) Are Indigents Entitled to a Partisan Expert?
The Supreme Court's decision in Ake has raised the issue of whether
defendants have the right to a partisan or simply to a neutral psychia-
trist.297 The role of the psychiatric expert is that of "help[ing to] deter-
mine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to
assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric wit-
nesses."'298 This role implies an expert who is partisan. 299 Justice Rehn-
quist, in his dissent in Ake, took the position that because a psychiatrist's
289. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
290. See Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 1985) (remand for more specific
findings). But see Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 1987) (review of record
demonstrates failure to state reasons was harmless error). See also McKeever v. Israel, 689
F.2d 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 1982) (abuse of discretion to fail to exercise discretion to appoint or
not to appoint counsel); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1981) (same).
291. Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 888
(7th Cir. 1981) (courts must consider merits even when not frivolous); Annotation, Appoint-
ment of Counsel, supra note 174, at 671 (same).
292. See Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (case straightforward);
Wade v. Duckworth, 626 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (factors not too complicated);
Lockert v. Faulkner, 574 F. Supp. 606, 608 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (appointment denied-facts not
in dispute and legal implications were clear).
293. See Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1981) (prisoner's handling of the
case demonstrated lack of working knowledge of the legal process).
294. See id. (confinement to wheelchair and constant pain prevented prisoner from investi-
gating his case).
295. See Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 1983) (complex medical evidence
involved), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
296. See Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1983) (threshold question
should be merit of case); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 1982); Tripati v.
Polland, 610 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
297. See Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigence Preclude In-
sanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 709 (1986) (authored by Mark P. Goodman); Note, Expert
Services, supra note 11, at 1345-57; The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV.
120, 136-37 (1985).
298. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985).
299. See Note, supra note 274, at 963 (psychiatric experts can do far more for the defense
than testify in court).
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role is not one of an advocate, the defense is entitled only to a competent
opinion from a psychiatrist independent of the prosecutor's office.3c°
The importance of a partisan expert in a civil proceeding may be as
great as in the criminal context. 301 In both instances the expert can be
invaluable not only in testifying,30 2 but also in assisting counsel or the
pro se indigent in preparation of the case,303 assembling, creating, and
interpreting information, 304 and cross-examination of the opponent's wit-
nesses, especially experts.30 5 A neutral expert would not serve those
functions.306
Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a neutral expert
would be required to report her results to both parties. 30 7 This would
place a tremendous burden on an indigent litigant's decision to use an
300. Ake, 470 U.S. at 92.
301. But see C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 17 (3d ed. 1984) (endorse-
ment of use of neutral experts to reduce partisanship in selection of experts and presentation of
their results).
302. [W]hile probative and rigorous cross-examination of an opposing psychiatrist
may partially fulfill [the] role [of the defense attorney of adducing probative evidence
in support of her client's claims and in challenging the State's evidence], "calling to
the stand a psychiatrist... is an even better way of forcing judges and juries to use
their common sense."
Perlin, The Supreme Court, The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric Testimony
in Death Penalty Cases, and The Power of Symbolism.- Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles
Heel, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 91, 127 (1985) (quoting Ennise & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 746
(1974)). See also Note, People v. Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions
of Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1080 (1982) (authored by Steven
M. Garrett) ("almost impossible to defend effectively against allegations by mental health ex-
perts without an expert of one's own").
303. Cf Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity De-
fense, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1061, 1064-66 (1962) (psychiatrist can aid counsel in case prepara-
tion and can aid in defining and clarifying of issues).
304. See Note, supra note 274, at 963 (can assist counsel in preparing and designing de-
fendant's case).
305. Cf Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (The accused has opportunity for
meaningful confrontation of State's case through cross-examination of State's expert witnesses
by his own experts.); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967) (same).
306. See United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985) (indigent defendant
entitled to appointment of psychiatric expert even though psychiatrist had been appointed to
examine defendant at the request of the government).
A contrary view is that so long as the litigant has access to a competent expert who will
conduct the appropriate examinations, assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
the case, there is no further right to have that expert be to the litigant's personal liking. See
Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 935 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (no entitlement to favorable expert),
modified on other grounds, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986).
The appointed expert in a criminal case may even be one employed by the state. See Roach v.
Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1471-72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
307. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
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expert. If the expert's analysis turned out to be unfavorable, the other
side would be given evidence they might not otherwise have developed.
Ultimately, reliance on neutral experts places indigents at a disad-
vantage in the adversarial system because they do not have the "re-
sources to participate independently in [the] 'battle of the experts.' -38
To some extent, use of a neutral expert shifts the ultimate decision in the
case away from the trier of fact to the expert because the opinions of a
neutral court-appointed expert, who appear to have judicial sanction may
be given more credence. 309
Conclusion
Without the right to expert assistance, indigent civil litigants can be
put in a legal "Catch 22, '3 °10 legally required to produce expert testi-
mony, yet unable to afford it. Based on a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions applying the due process clause in the context of indigents' claims
for access and equipage, it appears that a right to expert assistance for
indigent civil litigants exists in appropriate cases. No longer should indi-
gents be placed at a disadvantage in those cases solely due to an inability
to afford experts to support or defend their position.
Returning to the indigent couple described in section I, facing an
eviction suit and unable to retain an expert on the local housing market:
consider how a request for expert assistance would be handled by the
trial judge. In determining whether an expert should be appointed, the
judge would apply the three Mathews factors. The first, the private inter-
est at stake, would be great. Not only is the couple pursuing a financial
claim for back rent, they face eviction if unsuccessful. These are serious
property and liberty interests.3" By contrast, the governmental interest
308. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1349; Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note
11, at 337 n. 121 (" 'battle of the experts' refers to the tendency in insanity cases for the testi-
mony of opposing psychiatrists to conflict") (citing McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155-57
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951)).
309. Note, Expert Services, supra note 11, at 1350 ("judge or jury ... almost invariably
accepts the expert's opinion"). This danger that the jury may abdicate its decisionmaking
responsibility in favor of the expert may be somewhat diminished by FED. R. EVID. 706(c)
which gives the court discretion whether to "authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that
the court appointed the expert witness."
310. Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987) (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(referring to indigent pretrial detainees inability to retain medical experts to establish that
jailers neglected to provide medical treatment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1298 (1988).
311. It has been argued that liberty interests are implicated by the eviction process. Due
to the unavailability of affordable housing, eviction of low-income people could well result in
their becoming homeless: "Because the threat of eviction poses the threat of homelessness and
its devastating consequences, the liberty interest at stake is one which falls within the rubric
enunciated by the [Supreme] Court in Lassiter." Scherer, supra note 229, at 564-69.
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is mixed. Counterbalancing the costs of providing expert assistance are
the numerous expenses the state incurs in caring for the homeless. 31 2 Fi-
nally, expert assistance in this context is invaluable. Without it, the
couple will lose their case, regardless of the merits. Clearly, under these
circumstances, the court should grant their request.
The constitutional right to expert assistance is really a subset of the
broader due process right to equipage. This right includes, for example,
claims by indigent civil litigants for laboratory tests, such as the blood
tests used in paternity proceedings, 313 investigators or computer analyses.
Each such request should be tested under the Mathews factors. Denial of
claims for these types of assistance violates the fundamental fairness re-
quired by due process.
312. Id. at 576-79.
313. Cf Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (court granted defendant tests).
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